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IN THE SUPREME COGfil OF THE STATE OF L"I'AH 
IVAN JENKINS, 
Plalil.tiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHARLES M. PARRISH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 15905 
BRIEF OF APPELIANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for rredical malpractice brought by the plaintiff, Ivan 
Jenkins, agalil.st the defendant, Dr. Charles M. Parrish, a specialist in the 
field of open-heart surgery, for injuries sustalil.ed during the course of open-
heart surgery from 'Nhich the plaintiff suffered severe brain darnage and blind-
ness, and which occurred as a result of the defendant' s failure to supply an 
adequate blood supply to the Plalil.tiff during the open-heart surgery. 
DISPOSITION IN THE I.DWER COURI' 
The case was brought on a theory of negligence and was tried before a 
jury. The trial court submitted the issues of liability and damages to the 
jury. Upon the evidence the appellant was allowed to present, and upon the 
instructions of the court, the jury found that the defendant was not negligent. 
The appellant's rrotions for a directed verdict and new trial were denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision in the trial court below 
and an order remanding tJ1e case for a new trial. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF F?.CTS 
A. Error Cammi tted in Selection of Jury. During the 
course of the voir dire examination in open court, one of t~ 
jurors, Judith Eddins, volunteered that her ex-husband was a 
veterinarian and her father was an M.D. (i'ledical Doctor) (R. 68 , 
The venireman further volunteered "The fact that my father was 
an M.D. would influence rr,e." (R. 689.l Counse 1 for appellant 
specifically challenged this juror for cause. (R. 690.) 
Appellant's counsel then requested that the court conduct a 
further hearing of the matter in chambers so as to not belabor· 
matter of bias and prejudice before the entire jury panel. (R. • 
The court then held a hearing in chambers in which questions wt: 
asked of the venireman Judith Eddins which established that: 
1. She would be somewhat partial to the doctor. 
2. She would feel that the defendant medical doctor's 
testimony would be "more likely to be truthful than untruthful. 
3. She would give more weight to his testimony simply 
because he's a doctor. (R. 699-702, see Appendix "A".) 
Thereupon the in camera proceeding was concluded and after a 
few additional questions by the coi.:rt, plaintiff's counsel ren<" 
their challenge for cause of venireman Eddins which the court 
denied. ( R. 699.) Whereupon the plaintiff's counsel removed 
venireman Eddins by exercising peremptorial challenge (Plaintii: 
number 3, R. 369). 
B. Errors Cammi tted Durina Trial. The appellant in 
February of 1972 was a 46-year-old man who had been employ~~ 
a rigger for Kennecott Copper Corpora ti on. The appellant hac 
-2~ 
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been having difficulty with heart problems, but previously had 
no difficulty with vision, equilibrium, coordination, memory, 
personality change or speech until he had open heart surgery on 
February 21, 1972, by the respondent, Dr. Charles M. Parrish, 
a thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon. Appellant first was seen 
by the respondent doctor in the early part of February 1972. 
Thereafter, certain tests were administered to the appellant, 
and the respondent doctor advised the appellant to have open heart 
surgery for a triple by-pass graft of veins upon the heart. The 
operation was a success as far as intended to correct the heart 
difficulties. No claim is made concerning the heart repair 
itself. 
Appellant makes claim for injuries that occurred due to 
improper perfusion (supplying inadequate pressures and amounts of 
oxygenated blood to vital organs, specifically, the brain and 
eyes) during the surgery upon the heart. The injuries claimed were 
partial blindness, certain loss of coordination and impairment of 
equilibrium, memory loss, personality changes and slowness of speech. 
Appellant's doctors, Dr. Charles Bailey, a cardiovascular surgeon, 
Dr. William Hoyt, a neuro-ophthalmologist, and Dr. Ward Woods, 
a neurologist, all testified that these injuries had occurred 
during and as a result of the perfusion inadequacy during the 
open heart surgical procedure. (R· 1362, Appendix B, 891.) 
The appellant, his wife, family and friends all verify that the 
appellant complained of these problems iminediately after the 
surgery at various times during the recuperative period. 
-3-
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(R. 1271-1280, 794-803, 807-813, 1253-1255.) Dr. Parrish's hospital record 
and his office record do not re=rd any problem, as though it didn • t exist, 
until six weeks after the surgery when,he referred in an office note to 
Post Purrp visual proble'11S. (~. 852-859, Exhibit 2P.) Dr. Parrish admitt~ 
that coordinated visual problems appearing irnrediately after surgery would: 
significant and he would stop doing surgery until the problem was found. 
(R. 851-3, 2037.) But, he !l'ade no such investigation. (R. 857-9, 871, 888. 
At the trial, Dr. Parrish, the defendant and respondent, testifa: 
concerning the surgery he perforrr.ed and the rrenner in which it was carrieJ 
out. 
Certain procedures designed to insure ade:ruate flow from the hear 
lung purrp were omitted, and certain other pr=edures fell below the standar: 
of acceptable rniru.rrel care exercised by experts in the sarre field in citle< 
of corrparable size, and throughout the medical profession accordir1g to Dr. 
Charles Bailey, a noted cardiovascular surgeon. Dr. B:l.iley was professor 
and director of the department of thoracic surgery at Hahnerran Medical Coll' 
fran 1952 U."ltil 1959 and chainnan of the department of surgery at New Yorx 
!V'edical College fran 1959 to 1962, then an instructor of cardiovascular 
surgery fran 1962 until 1974. (R. 1309.) Dr. Bailey has written over 200 
medical articles, alrrost all of than on thoracic surgery and heart surgery; 
he has written three rredical books and contributed to several other tooks. 
( R. 1313-1314.) He has an honorary Doctor of Hurran Letters from Rutgers 
University and an honorary Doctor of Law fran Hahnerran Medical College, an: 
;.ias part of a team which received the J>merican 1':€dical Association's gold 
medal award for presentations on heart surgery in 1951 and in 1971. He 
belongs to a multitude of medical s=ieties, including honorary merntersrJf· 
-4-
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in Portugal, Brazil, Mexico and has lectured and derronstrated all over the 
united States, was president of the International College of surgeons and a 
rrerrter of every rrajor national thoracic surgery society in the United states. 
(R. 1314-1316 .) He was one of the pioneers in by-pass graft vascularization 
procedures. (R. 1318.) Dr. Bailey testified of countless contacts with 
physicians from all over the United States at the national rreetings of the 
various societies and organizations to which he has J::elonged. 
Both Dr. Bailey and the defendant Parrish were trained in thoracic 
surgery in New York City. (R. 836.) Dr. Parrish's testirrony was to the 
effect that when Mr. Jenkins went on the pump, the blood pressure started at 
a level of 30-35 and then slowly rose during the procedure. (R. 1013-1015.) 
Neither he nor his technician actually recorded what the blood pressures had 
teen during the pump run. (R. 972 .) In the years J::efore Mr. Jenkins' operation, 
Dr. Parrish had followed procedures to determine e:xactly how much blood went 
into the patient, that is, the perfusion flow rate during the pump run. 
(R. 877, 961, 1017.) The doctor originally calculated the necessary flow rate 
l::efore surgery in order to provide an adequate am:nmt of oxygen to the 
tissue (R. 877-78), rreasured the brain function with an electroencephelogram 
(R. 1017), and rronitored the blood temperature at the pump (R. 1018), and 
measured the oxygen in the blood (R. 1018-20), but discontinued all of these 
precautions. Dr. Parrish's pump technician kept the infonration concerning 
flow rates on a specific fonn (Exhibit 6P, R. 887). At the trial, the flow 
rate of 1, 000 cc• s per minute recorded by the technician was disclaimed by 
Dr. Parrish as an "obviously incorrect flow rate." (R. 888-89.) The trial 
court refused to require Dr. Parrish to answer the question as to whether or 
not, if the pump technician actually felt that 1,000 cc's was an adequate 
-&-
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flow rate, then that purrp technician \-JO.S irrproperly trained. (F.. 888-S?.) 
Dr. Parrish excll.3ed tr.is technical error by stating that he relied on tf.€ 
patient's blood pressure rather than following the flow rate (R. 888-8?). 
even trough he admitted there were instances where the flow rate could dz: 
but blood pressure would rerrain constant (R. 962), such as when drugs are~. 
that cause vasodilation, which leads to r:oolinc; of blood in the veins. 1.0. 
During the course of the trial, the appellant ' s counsel called 
Dr. Parrish's purrp technician, Diane nelson, who worked under the directi:: 
of the resp:indent surgeon, as to practices she eniployed while operating th€ 
heart-lung by-pass machir:e durir.g course of the surgery. 
Dr. Parrish's purrp technician was merely trair.ed to put the blo:i 
back into the 1:xxl.y v.:hich carre out. (R. 893, 1043.) However, if there is 
p:ioling cf the blood in the veins, then it wouldn 't return to the P\JIT1P for 
the l::xxiy ar.d, therefore, the flow rate would go down. R. 905. Jr. Pare: 
used large arrounts of rrorphine, which is a ver.ous vasodilator, accord.inc; :: 
the testirrony of Dr. Bailey; but Dr. Parrish didn't know whether it was a 
vasodilator or not (R. 905-06), and it is, therefore, reasor.atle to cor;cl\::: 
that Dr. Parrish would be unaware of this effect causi.."'lg a reduction of L: 
rates. 
The plaintiff's evidence at trial was to the effect that accordl:: 
to the standard of care of capable, competent thoracic heart surgeons in 
similar localities, it was a departure fran the standard of care to rrerel;· -, 
sure that the blood which carre fran the purrp was pun;ped back into the paue: 
and it was a departure fran the standard of care to let the blood pressure 
drop down to the 30-35 range. i'.>.ccording to the testi:cony 0f Dr. Charles 
Bailey, rrore precautions were required by the general comnuni ty of thorac; 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5urgeons who practiced in similar localities. Dr. Bailey testified that it 
.,;as :ncuml:::ent upon the operating surgeon and his pump technician to: 
1. M:iir1tain a blood pressure above fifty millirreters of rrercury during 
t~e tll11e the heart-lung rrachine provides the blood flow and pressure, 
esrecially when the patient has a pre-operative blood pressure of 120 over 80, 
and a rr.ean pressure of about 95 to 100. R. 1347-1349. 
hltrDugh Dr. Parrish permitted the blood pressure to hover as low 
as 30, brain darrage occurs when the mean pressure is allowed to be below 50 
for any significant period of tirre. (R. 1848.) 
2. Calibrate the blood flow going into the patient through the heart-lung 
p\Jl11p and to rraintain a minimum standard of flow to keep the brain and tissues 
alive. 
Dr. Parrish's agent and pump technician kept a record of flows on a 
PllllP infusion record. She did not calibrate the rrachine, and the numbers 
recorded were so low that a human of ~ir. Jenkin's size could not renain alive. 
(?. 1341 and 1343.) The flow rates recorded were stated by Dr. Parrish and 
Dr. Bailey to be in error. ( R. 988-89, 1343 .) The pump technician did not 
atterrpt to calibrate the pump rrachine, but, rather, relied on the calibration 
made years before by a f oTITier technician who calibrated the purrp using a 
different sized tubing. (R. 1045-1048.) 
Thus, the tech."lician and the surgeon could not and did not know the 
rate of blood flow into the patient during surgery. 
3. Assess and rraintain a minimum flow rate of blood through the Cody 
fran the heart-lung pump rrachine. The minimum blood flow necessary to prevent 
brain and tissue injury was high when the body temperature was high and was 
lu,,er when the temperature of the brain and tissues were lower· (~. 1345-1347 .) 
-7-
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Dr. Parrish reduced the blood flow tefore the brain teITlj:€rat ,. ure ,, 
cooled down to where it could survive on such flow (R. 1348), and warmed ur 
the l:::ody tefore increasing the blood perfusion flow. ( R. 1346 .) 
4. Assess the blood flow by direct measurerrent rather than by relyir; 
blood pressure, which was not proportional to flow. (R. 1350-1351, 1354.) 
Dr. Parrish and his technician relied on replacerrent of the bleo; 
which cane out of· the patient's l:::ody and on the patient's blood pressure to 
determine adequacy of flow. If the blood pooled in the patient's veins, or 
if the blood was lost through the herrorrhage which is part of surgery, ther. 
there would te reduced venous return and reduced perfusion flow. ( R. 1351-1': 
At the same time, the blood pressure may te up when blood perfusic 
flow (to the crain and orgar.s) is down. (R. 1350-1351.) So, direct rreasurere 
of flow is necessary to prevent brain dalrage. 
5 . Z1easure the l:::ody terrperature at a point which would reflect the 
brain terrperature rather than the terrperature of the inflow of cooling blo:x 
which was used to cool the l:::ody. 
Dr. Parrish placed a thenrometer in the esophagus next to the int: 
of blood fran the heart-lung Pll!1'P. He should have used a rectal therrrorreter 
which rrore accurately reflects how much the l:::ody has teen cooled. (R. 1343-L 
This is important where the surgeon artificially stops the patier.t 
teating heart tefore the brain temperature has teen reduced to a safe level. 
'Ihe heart-lung pU!l'p flow was so much lower than the nonral flow put out by r 
heart that the brain would te endangered if the brain terriperature were Wl 
high. (R. 1344-1347 .) 
Sinoe Dr. Parrish's Plll11P technician had been erroneously recordif'. 
flow rates for several years, plaintiff proffered the testirrony of Mr. Cte 
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Dyson, a pump technician fran San Diego and Los Jlngeles, who, as noted ab:Jve, 
was well-qualified and who established a foundation that there was a 
national certifying organization of pi..rrrp technicians known as the Arrerican 
society of Extracorporeal Technicians. Mr. Dyson had attended nurrerous 
conferences and seminars for pump technicians and thoracic surgeons and had 
lllPressive credentials to establish the foundation that he was familiar with 
the practice of other pump technicians and that the field was not practiced by 
rugged individualists. The court sustained objections' to his testirrony based 
on lack of foundation where plaintiff' s cotIDsel could not qualify Mr. Dyson as 
an expert witness as to the standard of care expected of pi..rrrp technicians in 
the same locality, that is, Salt lake City. 
The court did not allow the testirrony of Charles Dyson, pi..rrrp 
technician fran San Diego and Los lfilgeles who had run sane l, 500 pi..rrrp runs 
(R. 1081), trained other pi..rrrp technicians in both San Diego and Los Jlngeles, 
taught Cardiac Pulrronary Physiology at the college level (R. 1070), was 
certified by the Arrerican SOciety of Extracorporeal Technicians since 1970 
( a society that meets regularly and publishes guidelines for standards of 
practice in the field of open-heart surgery) .(R. 1064-67.) This national 
accrediting organization holds regional professional rreetings and conferences 
just like physicians do. (R. 1068-70.) 
Mr. Dyson had read nurrerous texts and medical periodicals concerning 
perfusion, attended nurrerous conferences and seminars for pi..rrrp technicians 
and thoracic surgeons, was familiar with the Sams heart-lung P\.ID"P of the type 
used on the appellant (R. 1075-78), and had nurrerous other qualifications to 
testify as to the standards of a similar locality. (R. 1062-78, 1108-1113.) He 
•,vas of the opinion that there was a minimum standard of practice arrong P\.ID"P 
-9-
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technicians throughout the country. (R. 1109.) But the trial court sust · air.~ 
an objection based on lack of foundation where plaintiff's counsel could r.r 
qualify his expert witness as to the standard of care in the sane locality. 
(R. 1113.) 
Before this, plaintiff presented evidence that Dr. Parrish and t:, 
other physicians whc were practicing heart-lung by-pass surgery in Salt J..a.i:' 
City in 1972 were not trained in Salt Lake City for the perforrre.nce of t~t 
surgery in general. Dr. Parrish adrni tted that the physicians were trainee 
literraly all over the country, and testified very clearly in the record fa 
the standards of practice -were based upon rredical knowledge and exi;:erience 
frcm all over the country. (R. 1094-1103.) 
Mr. Dyson was not permitted to testify as to the standards eiq::ect2 
of a pump technician concerning the frequency of calibration of the heart-le 
pump to ::ieternine ;.;hat the actual flow rate was (R. 1119-20), as to what tti 
flow rate would be on the rrachine if the rrachine had been calibrated to fk 
l, 100 cc' s per minute with quarter-inch tubing and then the tubing was cler.C' 
to 3/8-inch tubing, as occurred here (R. 1126), as to whether or not the 
esophageal temperature probe used in Mr. Jenkin' s case accurately reflectee: 
temperature of the bcdy (R. 1139-41), and finally, the witness was not 
permitted to testify as to whether there was a minimum standard of practice 
arrong such pump technicians with regard to rronitoring of blood pressure. 
(R. 1175-78.) This latter objection was sustained because of the framin9 of 
the question in temtS of an area similar to Salt Lake City, rather than in 
Salt Lake City. 
On the second day of trail, prior to asking plaintiff's expert 
1 . . ff' ~el had sul:mltte witnesses concerning the standard of care, p ainti s coun"' 
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a detailed t\velve-page brief (R. 113) which clearly sets forth the apparent law 
within the state of Utah in support of the Similar Locality rule. Counsel for 
the defendant doctor sui:::mitted no rrerrorandurn concerning the standard of care. 
[)?spite plaintiff's efforts in submitting the brief and advising the court of 
the apparent adoption of the similar locality rule, the trial oourt failed and 
refused to rule as to which of the two rules apparently applied (R. 1174), but, 
apparently, refused to allow evidence as to the standard of care in a similar 
locality, and rather pointedly enforced the strict locality rules. 
The court required the appellant to show that his expert witnesses had 
experience and were familiar with the same local standard of care that existed 
in the Salt Lake City area (R. 1339) which standard, according to the respondent's 
expert rredical witnesses (R. 1679-80, 1741-1746), required far fewer precautions, 
suggesting a lower standard of care than that enunciated by the appellant's expert 
rredical witnesses, Dr. Charles Bailey, the cardiovascular surgeon from New York 
City, New York, and Charles Dyson, the pump technician froro IDs Angeles, California 
Although Dr. Bailey did qualif'J and did give testinony under the strict locality 
rule (R. 1317-1318, 1340), since it was obvious that Dr. Bailey was not as familiar 
wib~ the practice in Salt Lake City as the respondent's witnesses, who were 
actually practicing in Salt Lake City, the jury, in all probability dismissed Dr. 
Bailey's testirrony regarding practice in Salt Lake City as less authoritative. 
During the course of the trial, the oourt allowed a surprise witness, Dr. 
Russell Nelson, to testify, although his name had not been previously disclosed, 
as required at a prior pre-trial hearing held September 12, 1977, and also at 
enpaneling of the jury at the oornrencerrent of the trial. 
During the cross-examination of defense witnesses, Dr. Nelson and Dr. 
Hughes by plaintiff's counsel, the oourt refused to allow the plaintiff's cou.'1Sel 
to cross-examine them as to whether their own procedures for operation of the 
heart-1 ung pump were the same as those of or. Parrish (R. 1716-17, 17 4 7) and re -
fused testirrony ooncerning how the other heart surgeons operated their pumps. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS A JUROR FOR CAV 
AND THEREBY FORCED THE PLAINTIFF TO WASTE ONE OF HIS PEREMP'. 
CHALLENGES. 
A. The trial court.erred in failing to dismiss the~~ 
spective juror, Mrs. Eddins, for cause. 
Rule 47 (f) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribe 
challenge for cause upon the grounds, "That a state of mi~ 
exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, 
or to either party, which will prevent him from acting im-
partially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of 
the party challenging." During the course of the voir diu 
of the jury panel, a prospective juror, Judith T. Eddins, 
revealed personal relationships which would tend to make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for her to be impartial in 
tl":::.s ::';pe of lawsuit. Her father was a medical doctor and, 
in addition, she had been married to a veterinarian who had 
been a defendant in a malpractice case. (T. 684). Mrs. 
Eddins was also a personal acquaintance of one of the defend-
ant's expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Wray. ( T • 6 7 8 ) • When 
asked whether she could, in spite of these relationships, act 
impartially as a juror, she stated that she could not. 
(T. 700). The state of mind evidenced by Mrs. Eddins clearly 
comes within the provisions of Rule 4 7 ( f) ( 6) , URCP, and she 
should have been dismissed for cause. The trial court ea~ 
in failing to do so. 
-12-
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This Court has consistently required that jurors sitting 
in judgment in this state be impartial and unbiased as man-
dated by Rule 47(f) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P. 2d 1091 (Utah 1975), a pro-
spective juror was challenged for cause when she indicated 
that she had strong feelings about wrongful death actions. 
The trial court in Crawford refused to dismiss the witness for 
cause, presumably because the witness stated that in spite of 
her feelings she could be an impartial and unbiased juror. 
This Court reversed holding that in spite of her expressed 
desire and ability to remain fair and impartial, she should 
have been dismissed for cause. 
One doubts that a person who harbors 
strong feelings concerning anyone who would 
see to recover money for the death of an-
other could be a fair and impartial juror. 
(Crawford, supra, at 1092.) 
It is apparent from Crawford, supra, that when a pro-
spective juror reveals a state of mind that would obviously 
make it doubtful that he or she could remain impartial and 
unbiased, such a person must be dismissed for cause to insure 
the integrity of the trial, even if the prospective juror in 
question affirmatively states that he or she could remain fair 
and impartial. In the instant case, Mrs. Eddins clearly ex-
pressed a biased state of mind, and worse, unlike the Crawford 
case where the prospective juror maintained she could remain 
impartial, Mrs. Eddins candidly revealed that she could not 
remain impartial. 
-13-
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THE COURT: Would you be inclined to give 
more weight to the testimony of--well, per-
haps I'd better not ask it that way. Even 
though your father is a medical doctor, 
do I understand that you do not believe that 
you would be able to listen to the evidence 
and based thereon render a fair and impartial 
verdict? Or, let me put it another way: Do 
you think if you were selected as a juror 
that you would be able to listen to the evi-
dence and based thereon render a fair and 
impartial verdict?' 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: I definitely believe 
they can make mistakes. I would hope I 
could listen to it. But I know I would 
be somewhat partial to the doctor. 
THE COURT: Well, are you telling me that 
you would give more weight to the testimony 
which would be presented on behalf of the 
defendant in this action simply because he 
happens to be a medical doctor? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No, I think I could weigh 
the evidence. I think when it got to his 
personal testimony that would be the only 
time it would possibly influence me, and I 
would feel it was more likely to be truth-
ful than untruthful. 
THE COURT: And I take it, then, your an-
swer would be that you would give more weight 
to his testimony simply because he's a 
doctor? 
VENIREMAN EDDINS: I'm afraid so. 
added.) 
(Emphasis 
As the transcript shows, there is no question but ~a 
Mrs. Eddins should have been removed for cause; she was hl 
and candidly said so. Thus, the facts in the instant case 
argue even more strongly for dismissal than those found in 
Crawford case. 
In a more recent case, this Court reaffirmed its dete 
mination to assure that only impartial, unbiased jurors be 
empaneled. State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629 (Utah 1977) prese 
the case of a prospective juror who was challenged for cau 
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;e. 
when he stated that he did not know for certain whether he 
could act impartially in arriving at a verdict. The trial 
court refused to excuse the prospective juror for cause. 
This Court, as in Crawford, again reversed and remanded the 
case, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to dis-
miss the prospective juror for cause since he could not state 
affirmatively that he could act impartially as a juror. Note 
that in Moore, supra, there were sufficient grounds to compel 
a dismissal for cause when the prospective juror simply could 
not state whether or not he could act impartially. And in 
Crawford, supra, even though the prospective juror affirmatively 
stated that she could be impartial in spite of her strong 
feelings against the type of case involved, the Court held that 
she should have been removed for cause. As pointed out 
above, in the instant case Mrs. Eddins not only expressed bias 
and prejudice, she actually stated she would have difficulty 
remaining impartial. Clearly under Rule 47(f) (6), and the 
Crawford, supra, and Moore, supra, decisions, Mrs. Eddins 
should have been dismissed for cause; the trial court committed 
reversible error in failing to do so. 
B. The trial court's failure to remove the prospective 
juror, Mrs. Eddins, for cause prejudiced the Plaintiff in that 
:r.' he was forced to waste one of his peremptory challenges to 
remove her. 
:e; 
Despite the fact that the prospective juror, Mrs. Eddins, 
expressly indicated that she could not remain impartial, 
-15_ 
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(R. 700), the trial judge declined to remove her for cause 
I 
and it became necessary for the Plaintiff to remove her ~ 
use of one of his three peremptory challenges. In the casi 
of Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 109 (Utah 1975) this Cou~ 
held that a party should not be compelled to waste a 
peremptory challenge on a ] uror who should have been excusi 
for cause. In Crawford, supra, the appellant used one of 
his three peremptory challenges to remove a prospective jw 
whom the trial court should have removed for cause but re-
fused to do so. Upon review, this Court found that the pn 
specti ve juror evidenced actual bias compelling her remova 
When the trial court failed to remove the prospective juro: 
in question, the Plaintiff was prejudiced in that he was ~ 
to waste a peremptory challenge to accomplish that which ti 
trial court should have done. This Court reversed and 
remanded on that ground, stating: 
A party is entitled to exercise his three 
(3) peremptory challenges upon impartial 
prospective jurors, and he should not 
be compelled to waste one in order to 
accomplish that which the trial judge 
should have done. (Crawford, supra, 
at 1093.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with the same issue 
on two occasions since the Crawford, supra, case was de-
cided in 1975. On both occasions the court has affirmed 
its decision in Crawford. In State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 
629 (Utah 1977) the trial court refused to excuse a juror 
for cause after the juror indicated actual bias. The de-
fendant then exercised one of his peremptory challenges 
to excuse the juror. The Court, relying on Crawford, 
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~upra, held that the juror should have been dismissed 
for cause, but since he was not, the defendant was forced 
to waste one of his peremptory challenges to have the 
juror excused. The Court further held that such was 
pre]udicial error, and the defendant was granted a new 
trial. 
In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977) 
this Court again held that when a trial judge improperly 
refused to excuse a juror for cause, thus forcing a party 
to waste one or more of his peremptory challenges, that 
party has been prejudiced and will be granted a new trial. 
In Brooks, two jurors were challenged for cause on the 
basis that they were personal friends with key witnesses 
for the prosecution. The trial court, having refused to 
excuse the jurors in question, forced the defendant to 
waste his peremptory challenges to remove them. The 
Supreme Court, relying on Crawford, supra, reversed and 
remanded the case for a new trial stating: 
Defendant was entitled to four peremptory 
challenges (77-30-lS[b]) all of which he 
exercised. However, since he had to use two 
of the four peremptory challenges to remove 
the two jurors he challenged for cause, he 
was effectively deprived the use of two he 
might have used to remove other jurors whom 
he so desired. Under such circumstances, 
there was prejudice. (Brooks, supra, at 801.) 
A recent Arizona case found the Utah Court's reason-
ing in Crawford v. Manning, supra, sound and relied there-
on in reaching the same result as the Utah Court did in 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Crawford. In Wasko v. Frankel, 569 P.2d 230 (Ariz, 1977), 
which, like the instant case, involved a claim for med-
ical malpractice, the trial court declined to excuse a 
prospective juror challenged for cause, after he had made 
statements indicating he was biased. The plaintiff used 
one of his peremptory chall~nges to remove the juror. 
The court held that such circumstances prejudiced the 
plaintiff and necessitated a new trial. In so holding 
that Court said: 
Peremptory challenges form an effective 
method of assuring the fairness of a jury 
trial. Hence, forcing a party to use his 
peremptory challenges to strike jurors who 
should have been stricken for cause de-
prives the litigant of a substantial right. 
(Wasko, supra, at 232.) 
In the instant case, as in Crawford, supra, Moore, 
supra, and Wasko, supra, the challenged prospective juror 
clearly should have been removed for cause but the trial 
court fa~led to do so. And, as in the above cases, the 
Plaintiff was forced to "waste" one of his peremptory 
challenges to "accomplish that which the trial court should 
have done." The Plaintiff was prejudiced as a result and 
must be granted a new trial. 
When the appellant argued the motion for a new trial 
and pointed out the error of the trial court concerning 
the failure to dismiss this juror for cause, the court took 
the position that appellants did not ask for a hearing or 
trial when the challenge was made against Mrs. Eddins for 
cause (R. 553). Such a hearing was in fact held in the 
-18-
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trial court's chambers, testimony was taken, and that 
testimony was certainly sufficient to demonstrate the 
prospective juror's bias and prejudice. 
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THE TRIF-_L JCDGE ERP.ED IY REQCIRI~JG THE PL,'.1.HiTIFF TC 
PROVE HIS c;._sE CONCER~iDfG THE ST_:'.\.NDARD OF '1EDIC'1.L 0.PE 
WP.ICH GOVERNED DEFENDAN':'.'' s CONJ::;UCT ,-0.CCORDn:c TO THE 
STRICT LOCALITY RULE, RATHER THAN THE SIMILAR LOCALITY 
RULE. 
During the course of the trial, counsel for the plaintiff calle: 
Charles Dyson, of san Die<;o and Los Angeles, California, an eminently we);. 
qualified heart-lung by-pass pump machine technician, as an expert in the 
use of said machine. Testi.rrony was elicited showing the witness to be an 
expert, l<nowledgable in the minimum standard of care in respect to the use 
of the said pump machine in 1972 in localities similar to Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Plaintiff's counsel propounded a series of questions to the witness 
concerning the l'linimum standards in locales si..'Tli.lar to Salt Lake City, but 
upon ob_-:ections from defense counsel, the witness was not allowed to test!' 
to these s-t::andards. (R. 1171-1179.) Although the trial court explicitly 
refused to give a reason for not allowing the witness to respond (R. 1172, 
1173), it is apparent, fran the defense counsel's voir dire of the 1vitness 
that the court refused to apply the "si.niilar locality" rule to expert test: 
rrony and instead tenaciously and Wl thout justification imposed the "str:~ 
locality" rule. 
The courts of the United States have used four basic approaches : 
establishing the standard of care to be required of physicians and surgeon: 
They have variously required that such practitioners exercise the skill arc 
care of physicians ~ good standing in ( 1) the defendant's same locality 
(strict locality rule); (2) the defendant's same general neighl:xxJ-:oo:l (sa.re 
general neighborhocd. rule); (3) localities similar to defendant's (simi~ar 
locality rule); or (4) the medical profession (national standard rule). 
-20-
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.onnot., 37 .;-. . L.R. 3d 420 (1971); D. Louisell and H. Williams, 1 Medical 
'lalpractice, 8.06 (1973). 
The "strict l=ality" rule was favorably adopted by some early courts 
in this country. Baxter v. Snow, 79 Utah 817, 2 P.2d 257 (1931). At the tirre 
of its first adoption, there was a rational basis for the application of such 
a rule, in wany instances. ?.t a t~ when carmunication and travel was more 
primitive, when there were fewer medical schools and they were located in a 
few large cities, and a majority of doctors were general practitioners who 
were isolated frcrn rrajor medical centers, it was unrealistic to scrutinize 
the standard of care of_ such local-cormrunity general practitioners by use of 
experts who were unaware of the limitations within that carrnunity. For an 
expert frcrn a rrajor medical facility to sit in judgment of a local doctor 
having limited facilities and little, if any, access to the most recent 
developnents at the major facilities,cou.1 d result in sane injustice. 
Happily, times have changed. Travel and carmunication has vastly 
improved over the years and rredical science has rrade great advancerrents. 
Whole new areas of medical knowledge have developed into specialized fields. 
Most, if not all, experts receive their advanced expert training frcrn rrajor 
rredical facilities. There is alrrost instant ccmnunication anong practicing 
experts of advancernents and discoveries made in their respective fields 
through professional journals and saninars. Experts regularly seek national 
certification. In such an atmosphere, the application of a strict locality 
rule IIBkes no sense. Experts practicing in their discipline all have access 
to the same knowledge, techniques and advancerrents, andany qualified expert 
is in a pcsition to know what is acceptable practice within the field of 
expertise in question and what is not. Certainly any physician who is 
practicing in a field as specialized as cardiac by-pass surgery in a najor 
city such as Salt Lake, and holds himself out as a nationally-trained and 
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l:oard certified expert shoulQ. not te insulated from the just criticism c: 
his qualified fellow experts ·,fho practice at sisrJ.lar redical centers. 
The rra.jority of jurisdictions in the United States have lcr.g 
erribraced a test which holds a defendant practitioner to the standard of ,, 
and care ordinarily observed by other physicians in good standing in tf.€ 
defendant's same or a si.'Tlilar locality. f.nnot. 37 F..L.R. 3d. 420 426 (i:· 
King and Coe, The Wisdan of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 Ealt. L. Rev. 221. 
222 (1974). Similar locality is defined not by socioeconomic and gec<;r2r:; 
factors but by the sin'J.larity of rredical factors such as medical scl:ools, 
teaching hospitals and research and laboratory facilities in the lcx:aliti: 
to te canpared. See C=k v. Lichbalu, 144 So. 2d 312 (Fla, Dist. CT. J.fp. 
1962); ~son v. Veeni:::oer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Cavallero 
SJ:-,arc, 54 R.I. 67, J.21 A.2d 669 (1956); Teig v. St. John's Eosoital, 63 
Wash 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963). See also 40 Ford.'larn L. Rev. 435, 439 
(1971); 14 Stan. L. Rev. 884, 890 (1962). 
~he following is a particularly good description of the proper 
factors to be considered in detennining an expert's qualifications under'::· 
similar locality rule: 
"The rrodern view of a rrajority of courts is that a rredical 
expert is free to testify in a rra.lpractice case if ris 
camrunity or other camiunities with wrich he is familiar 
rear sufficient similarity to that of the defendant. A.rid 
in determining sii.11ilari ty the courts will not now lock to 
such socioeconanic facts as population, type of econany, 
and incane level but to factors rrore directly relating to 
the practice of medicine. In the rra.in, an expert 
practicing in a locality having medical facilities 
comparable to those existing in the defendant's ccxmrunity 
is permitted to testify concerning the standard of care 
governing the defendant. ***The nurnl:er and quality of 
hospitals, laboratories and medical schools are typical 
=nsiderations . Of course +:he r_ature of the carrmmi ty in 
which tre witness currently practices is irrelevant if he 
happcJis also to possess fa.ntlliarity with standards in the " 
defendant's locale or in areas sufficiently sirrilar to it. 
Waltz. 18 I€Faul L. Rev. 408 at 415. 
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The atove rule is not foreign to the traditional notion of justice 
ir. tort law. .~ Justice Crockett r,:ointed out in the recent case of SWan 
v. Lamb, Gtah, 584 P.2d 814 (1978), the proper application of the "similar 
locality" rule is "but a specialized application of the standard of conduct 
so universally i.nipJsed bf the law: of requiring the degree of care which the 
ordinarY, reasonable and prudent person would observe under the sarre or 
sinUlar circumstances." Swan v. Lamb, supra at 819. Thus, experts practicing 
in tJ-e sarc,e field of expertise, having access to the sane fund of knowledge, 
receiving the same or sirr~lar training at similar medical facilities are 
quite properly qualified to testify concerning the applicable standard of 
care. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Riley v. Layton, 
329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), sane fifteen years ago, in applying Utah law, 
erl'braced tJ-e "similar locality" rule. Justice Crockett, in swan v. Lamb, 
supra, indicated that the Tenth Circuit was correct in doing so. 
The facts of the instant case clearly call for the application of 
the similar locality rule. The defendant, Dr. Parrish, was trained in New 
York City ( R. 836 ) , and he holds himself out as practicing by 
national standards of care. He was Board Certified to meet minimum national 
standards of practice and carpetency in 1957 (Depo. #1, p. 6). The basis of 
cardiovascular surgerf in Salt Lake City is not dependent upon what thoracic 
surgeons do in Salt Lake City alone. Dr. Parrish claims he has taken the 
usual steps to keep abreast of rredical developnents fran all over the co\IDt.ry 
and to conform his practice to those standards. Ee is a member of several 
national societies of heart doctors, including the Society of Thoracic 
Surgeons, the hnerican College of Chest Physicians, the J.rrerican College of 
Cardiology and the Trudeau society (Depo. #1, p. 5). He is also a member of 
the .'\merican ~'edical Association and of the various regional rredical groups 
\CePJ. #1, p. 5). 
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In order to keep up in this field, he subscril:es to the l\nnals 
--------Thoracic Surgery; Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Suraerv; Chest· 
----...o• 
Circulation; Mierican Journal of Cardiolooy; and the Archives of suraerv . 
.A.11 of these publications are edited and distributed on a national l:Bsis 
to sirni_lar doctors throughout the '=untry. 
The ~tandards of practice of doctors in New York City and other, 
of the country are not foreign to Dr. Parrish; he has attended post-grad\( 
=urses at fl'.ount Sinai Eospital in New York City (IRpo. 1±1, p. 9), as ·~l: 
in Bennuda (IRpo. #1, p. 9), and in places all over the country and out c' 
=untry (D=po. #l, p. 9) • 
He. has observed the practice of cardiovascular surgery using a 
by-pass purrp at hospitals in New York City at Roosevelt Hospital, New Yor:. 
Hospital, and Mount Sinai Eospital, and at hospitals in Texas and in vane 
parts of California. (R. 840, 841.) His observations at these institut 
were applied as a basis for his practice at !-Joly Cross Eospital (I::er::o. "L 
pp. 14-15) . Dr. Parrish holds himself out to be practicing at standards : 
quality of care which were corrparable to the al:ove institutions (Cer::o. #L 
pp. 14-15). 
It is, thus, very obvious that Dr. Parrish has held himself om. 
keeping abreast of the significant changes in the practice of surgery ty 
taking advantage of the available medical knowledge from all over the co!J: 
It is also apparent that the basis for his practice of medicine is not hi: 
limited experience in Salt Lake City, Gtah. Indeed, one could rationally 
claim that a doctor who did not take advantage of the medical knowledge a1: 
experience in other areas in a field as sophisticated as cardiovascular 
surgery would be negligent in not taking advantage of the available ¢c~ 
knowledge. It is quite clear, then, that in applying the "rredical factor' 
the courts consider with respect to the "sirnilar locality" rule, that 1' 
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sirrilar ITEClical facilities, experience and training, and considering tr.at 
Dr. Parrish practices in Salt Lake City at sane of the finest facilities in 
the country, he ought to be held to a standard consistent with that of 
other similarly well--<rualified corrpetent cardiovascular surgeons practicing at 
sL'Tiilar facilities in similar corrmunities. 
As indicated a!:ove, the appellant called Mr. Charles Dyson to 
testify as to the standard of care in the use of a heart-lung by-pass pump 
rra.chine. Mr. Dyson is a highly qualified pump technician who has perforned 
over L 500 "punip runs" during by-pass surgeries. (R. 1061.) He is a certified 
i:;erfusionist by the American Society of Extracorp:ireal Technicians. (R. 1065.l 
He has taught courses related to perfusion technology. (R. 1070.) He has 
attended seminars and listened to speakers throughJut the country. (R. 1069-71.) 
He is familiar with perfusion technology throughJut the country and in Salt 
Lake City. (R. 1011.) Nevertheless, the court imposed the strict locality 
rule, which prevented this expert witness fran giving his opinion concerning 
the standard of care in a similar locality. Had the plaintiff's witness been 
allowed to testify as to the standard of care in locales similar to Salt Lake 
City, Utah, he would have given testirrony that would have shJwn that the 
defendant doctor's care of the plaintiff fell far below the existing and 
recognized standard of care in similar localities with respect to operation of 
the heart-lung by-pass punip rra.chine. By refusing to allow st<Ch testirrony, 
the plaintiff was prevented fran presenting to the jury the very heart of his 
case. 'Ihe court's failure to allow the jury to judge the defendant doctor's 
c2r2 of the plaintiff by the standard of care in similar localities 'Was 
clearly prejudicial error. 
Later in the trial, the appellant called another expert witness, 
Dr. Charles Bailey. Dr. Bailey and the respondent Dr. Parrish have l:oth 
received training in New York. (R. 836, 1368-69.) Dr. Bailey is the authJr 
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of a text on thoracic surgery (R. 1311), has over two hundred articles c: 
thJracic and cardiac surgery to his credit. ( R. 1313. ) P.is qualif icatio°' 
set forth in the Statement of Facts. (See also R. 1309-1322, etc.) 
In spite of the fact that the respondent testified that he had nationwF 
training and held himself out as sw;iscribing to national standards, and 
despite the fact that the appellant ' s expert, Dr. Bailey, and the res!XJr,. 
both received their training in New York, Dr. Bailey was not allowed to 
testify as to the standard of care in similar l=ali ties. Dr. Bailey 111: 
eventually allowed to testify as to the standard of care practiced in Sa:· 
Lake City as he could testify to some familiarity with the practice of 
cardiovascular surgery in Salt Lake City. P.owever, as he was not actuaL 
engaged in medical practice in Salt Lake City, as were the defendant's 
experts, Dr. Russell M. Nelson and Dr. Richard K. Hughes, Dr. Bailey's 
testirrony about the ;ninirnum standard of care adhered to by Salt Lake 
cardiovascular surgeons was, in all likelihocxl., viewed by the jurors as !E 
auth.Jr1tatl'ie than the defendant's Salt Lake City-based expert witnesses. 
Much of the effectiveness of Dr. Bailey ' s testirrony was diluted by requi:. 
foundational questions which tended to sh.Jw minirral actual experience ar.c 
familiarity with the same locality, ~ .a Yis. the Salt Lake City, Utah, a: 
The net effect of the enployrrent of the sarre l=ality rule was 
that the respondent's expert witnesses testified to a much lower standari 
care and tended to better qualify by having more experience in the Salt~ 
City area, as they had actual practice within the area. 
In the recent case of Swan v. Lamb, Utah, 584 P.2d 814 (19781. 
this Court held it reversible error to apply the "sarre locality" rule w'r£ 
the "similar locality" rule should have teen applied. The facts in the ·
1 
case. are very similar. Both cases dealt with highly specialized areas 
medical expertise for which there were national standards: in ~ it '' 
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spinal surgery, and in this case it is cardiovascular by-pass surgery. In 
t:oth cases experts were offered who were highly regarded nationally-renowned 
surgeons. In both cases the experts had had wide experience concerning the 
practice of their specialty throughout the country. In both cases the 
defendant doctors were practicing at and associated with rrajor rred.ical 
facilities in salt Lake City, facilities that are highly regarded throughout 
the country. The reasoning of the Court in Swan is just as applicable to the 
instant case: 
"There is no reason to hold that doctors in salt Lake City 
who profess to be experts in the field of surgergy or 
medicine should not be held to the standards of care 
exercised by experts in the same field in cities of 
=mparable size and throughout the rred.ical profession." 
Swan, supra at 817. 
In that opinion, Justice Ellett went on to say: 
"OUr quality of rredical care in Utah rates with the best 
in the nation. Our hospitals are arrong the finest with 
the rrost recent technology, and the rredical =llege at 
the University of Utah enjoys an outstanding reputation. 
In addition, doctors practicing their profession here 
come fran various medical =lleges throughout the 
nation. Medical journals are available nationally as 
are seminars and workshops. There is no need for 
doctors here to have a lower standard of care than that 
of other doctcrs who are practicing in similar localities. 
Indeed, it is doubtful that any physician in the State of 
Utah would be willing to admit that his skill and 
knowledge is not equal to any other physician trained in 
his field, or that his ability is less than that of 
doctors trained and practicing in other cities." 
Swan, supra at 817. 
The trial court's refusal to allow Dr. Bailey to testify as to the standard 
of care of practicing cardiovascular surgeons in similar commmities and 
Mr. Charles Dyson concerning the standard of care in similar commmities 
in the use of by-pass pump rrachines constituted prejudicial error. 
~. the trial court's error calls for a reversal and a new trial. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
FAILED TO ALLOW OBJECTION'S CONCERNING JURY INSTRUCTIONS Tr 
BE MADE DIRECTLY TO THE COURT. 
A. Objections must be l:oth tlirely and specific. 
The trial court did not allow the plaintiff to make known to the 
court his objections to jury instructions, but rather required the objectio: 
be made to the court rep::lrter. 
Rules 46 and 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outline the:, 
procedure for making objections to jury instructions. Under Rule 46 it is:. 
longer necessary to make fonna.l exceptions concerning clallred error in jury 
instruction. 'imat Rule 46 does require is that a party make "known to the 
court" his obJection and his grounds therefore. Rule 51 adds the further re 
quirerrent that the objection must be rrade before the instr.ictions are given 
the jury, if the instructions are to be given in writing, or at least tefon 1 
jury retires, if the instructions are to be given orally. Rule 51 further: 
plifies the requirerrent of Rule 46 by mandating that objections to instruct 
not only must be rrade, but must be rrade with specificity. Thus for any clar 
error regarding jury instructions, (1) an objection must clearly be rrade, Ii 
the objections must be rrade in a tirrel y rranner, and ( 3) the objection must 
specifically state the grounds of the objection. Failure to make a t.irrely, 
specific objection to a clallred e=or in the instructions will ordinarily le' 
in the appellate court' s refusal to review the clallred e=or. Cordner .0 
Inc. 15 Utah 2d 86, 387 P.2d 685 (1963); In re Richards, 5 Utah 2d 106, 29i: 
542 (1956), Johnson v. Sirrons, Utah, 551, P.2d 515 (1976). 
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B. Purp::>se of the Rule. 
When Rules 46 and 51 are read together it is quite clear that what 
is irrp:Jrtant is not the taking of a formal exception but iraking known to the 
trial =urt the exact reasons of the objections at a tirre when an error can be 
corrected. In speaking to the purpose of the rule requiring timely, specific 
objections to the trial court's giving or refusing to give certain jury instruc-
tion, the Utah Suprerre Court has stated: 
One of the purp::>ses in requiring counsel to rrake objections 
to instructions in the trial court is to bring to the 
attention of the court all clairred errors in the instructions 
and to give him an opportunity to correct them if he deems it 
proper. Einployers Mut. Liability v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah 
251, 258 P.2d 445 (1953) at 450. 
And in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954), the court em-
phasized the need to keep the trial as free from error as possible by rraking a 
proper, tirrely and specific objection so that the trial court can correct any 
error: 
Generally appellate courts will not review a ground of 
objection not urged in the trial court. The duty is 
incumbent upon counsel to give the trial court the 
opportunity to correct the error before asking the 
appellate court to reverse a verdict and a judgrrent 
thereon. Pettingill, supra, at 186. 
M:::lst, if not all, jurisdictions in this country, have adopted procedural rules 
similar to Rules 46 and 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring 
objections to jury instructions to be timely and specific so that the trial 
judge can correct any error and thereby avert a mistrial or unnecessary appeal. 
See, for example, Michie v. Calhoun, 84 Ariz. 270 336 P.2d 370 (1959); In~ 
Site for Civic Center, 54 Wash. 2d 387, 341P.2d148 (1959); Tapia v. Panhandle 
Steel Erectors, Co., 78 N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967); Lathrop v. Smith, Nev., 
288 P.2d 212 (1955); Phillips v. Konornic, 159 Colo. 335, 411 P.2d 238 (1966); 
E:clwards v. Harris' Wyo.' 397 p. 2d 87 (1964) ; Ross v. CUthbert, 239 or. 429 I 397 
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P.2d (1964): _Robinson v. Kathryr:, 23 Ill. .?>.pp. 5 2d, 161 N.E. 2d 477 (!gs 
Rule 51 o"E the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ft 
a er which ~.~ 
51, URCP, is patterned, requires that objections be timely and specific. 
ccmrenting on the purpose of the rule, Professor Wright, in his treatise, 
of Federal Courts (3rd E.d.), at p. 465, states: 
Rule 52 precludes a claim of error for giving an irrproper 
instruction, or failure to give a proper one, unless an 
objection has been taken, stating distinctly the arounds 
of the objection, before the jury retires. Thus the 
judge is made aware of the supposed defect in the instruc-
tions while he still has an opportunity to correct it. 
And in 5A M:x:Jre's Federal Practice, paragraph 51.04, it states: 
The Rule does not require fornali ty, and it is not important 
in what form an objection is rrade or even that a fonral 
objection is ~ade at all, as long as it is clear that the 
trial judge understood the party's position; the purpose of 
the Rule is to inform the trial judge of possible errors so 
that he may have an opportunity to correct them. (at 2521) 
C. The purpose of Rules 51 and 46 is undermined if the trial cr. 
refuses to listen to counsel's proper objections. 
It is clear fran the above that what is contemplated by Rules 5' 
46 is an exchange between opposing counsel and the trial judge so that t!t 
judg-e can be fully informed by counsel of their respective opinions cancer 
claill,ed error in the jury instructions. Thus, having been fully appraise: 
counsel, the court can make a rrore informed ruling and avert possible errc 
In the instant case the trial court did not allow such an exchange to take 
place. Plaintiff was denied an opportunity to ~ake his objections to the c 
instead, the court absented himself and required plaintiff to rrake his obJe 
to the court reporter (R. 1827-39). Such a procedure undermines the inter.t 
the purpose of Rules 51 and 4 6. Such a procedure is a mere forrrali ty, a te 
exercise in making and preserving a record for appeal. It does not work ti 
the trial as error-free as possible. It cannot work to inforrr. the trial ; 
claimed error, for the judge is not present. It does, in fact, result JJ. 
-30-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
antithesis of the intended effect envisioned in Rules 51 and 46: whereas Rules 
51 and 46 atterrpt to eliminate fomality and work toward an error-free trial by 
infonning the judge of possible error, the procedure followed in the present 
case is a rreaningless fomality with no possibility of infoD!'ing the judge of 
error. 
In United States v. Certain Property Interests in Property in Borouah 
of Brooklyn, 326 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1964), the court expressly recognized that 
2ule 51, FRCP (upon which Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is patterned), 
r.ot only requires that counsel state distinctly and specifically the grounds for 
his objections, but also requires that the court afford counsel an opportunity 
to explain its objections. In so ruling, the court said: 
We emphasize that 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly 
pennits a party to state distinctly the !T'atter to which he 
objects and the grounds of his objection. One significant 
purpose of the rule is to allow the Lfrial7 judge to correct 
any errors in his charge brought to his attention by any of the 
parties. Unless the court pennits the parties to e?<Plain their 
objections, this important purpose of Rule 51 cannot be 
effectuated. (emphasis added) Certain Property Interests, 
supra, at 118. 
Rules 51 and 46 clearly intend that the trial court give to colll'lsel 
an opportunity to explain to him their objections with such specificity that he 
can fully understand that nature of any potential error. Such a procedure is 
the premise u_FOn which the requiranent of timeliness and specificity are based. 
As noted al::ove in Employers Mutual Liability, supra, the Utah Court stated that: 
One of the purposes in requiring counsel to !T'ake objections 
to instructions in the trial court is to bring to the attention 
of the court all clairred errors. (at 450, emphasis added) 
How can colll'lsel "bring to the attention of the court all claimed errors" if the 
court will not listen? In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), the trial 
court refused to consider a claimed error with regard to jury instructions 
because "there was no clear and correct statement to the court as to what 
ll1struction Defendant desired in that reaard." (at 358, emphasis added) Pere 
again the court expressly recognized that to satisfy the Rules, the objections 
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must be niade "to the oourt". Unless the ]'.Dtential error is actually "li'aC 
known to the court", the resul ~intended by Rules 51 and 46 will be frusti 
Courts in other jurisdictions who follow rules similar to our own Rules: 
46 all clearly recognize that the ~ial court must actually be rrade aware 
claiJred error. In Tapia v. Panhandler Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 4; 
625 (1967) the court said: 
The specific vice in the instruction must be ]'.Dinted out so 
as to leave no doubt that the a:>urt' s mind was actually alerte< 
to it. (at 632, emphasis added.) 
In State v. Compton, 57 N.M. 227, 257 P.2d 915 (1953), the New 
a:>urt further stated: 
The prirl'ary pur[X)se of any objection of an instruction is, 
of a:>urse, to alert the mind of the judge to the clailred 
error contained in it. This fundarrental purpose must be 
read into any and all rules on the subject. (at 921, emphasis 
added.) 
Such a purpose is indeed fundarrental to Rules 51 and 46, but t 
purpose is :ilnp::lssible to carry out if, as in the instant case, the trial 
refuses to have his mind alerted. In Saxton v. Harris, 395 P. 2d 71 (Ala 
the Alaskan Suprerre Court stated: 
The pur[X)se of this rule is to enable the trial judge to 
avoid error by affording him an op[X)rtunity to rorrect his 
charge before it goes to the jury. The dictates of the rule 
are satisfied only if the judge is clearly niade aware of the 
alleged error in an omission from the instructions. (at 73, 
emphasis added.) 
See also Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964); Lathrop v. 
288 P.2d 212 (Nev. 1955); Lucero v. Torres, 67 N.M. 10, 350 P.2d 1028 (1 
It is clear from the above that the dictates of Rules 51 and 4 
UCRP are not satisfied unless a:>unsel make their objections in a tirreiy 
specific manner. It is equally clear that the trial a:>urt must listen t 
objections, weigh them carefully, and rorrect any error in tine to avoic 
necessary appeals and retrials. In the iristant case, Plaintiff att.enl?i:t 
fully comply with Ru2.es 51 and 46, but the procedure followed by the trJ 
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by absenting himself when the objections ~re rra.de, denied the Plaintiff the 
opp::>rtunity to explain his objections as required by the rules, and in so doing, 
denied Plaintiff a fair trial. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRL"l.L COURT ERRED WITH RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWDJG JCJ 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
A. The Trial Court erred in giving Instuction No. 
dealing with the standard of care and who may testify then~ 
The second paragraph of jury instruction No. 12 ~ 
as follows: 
The only way you may properly learn such 
a standard, and thus determine whether or 
not the doctor conformed to it, is through 
evidence presented during this trial by 
physicians testifying as expert witnesses 
who knew or (sic) that standard as it ex-
isted at that time. 
This instruction ins~ructs.the members of the jury that on~ 
testimony af a phvsician can be relied on to determine the st 
of care. While such is quite often the case in medical malpr 
litigation, it is not always so. As more and more sophistica 
machines are employed in medical procedures, technicians who 
trained experts in the use of such machines are used to opera 
them. 
In the present case Mr. Charles Dyson, a highly qualifie 
heart-lung by-pass pump machine technician testified for the 
tiff concerning the physiology involved with the by-pass pu~ 
machine and the proper use of said machine. Mr. Dyson is qui 
clearly a highly knowledgeable expert in the field of by-pass 
pump machines. (R. 1081) By instructing the jury that only th 
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testinDny of expert physicians could be relied upon to establish the standard 
of care, the jury was erroneously mislead into rejecting out of hand all 
testinDny given by the appellant's by-pass pump machine technician. Such an 
L~struction prejudicially ha.rrred the appellant and denied him a fair trial. 
B. The Trial Court erred in that Instruction No. ll failed to 
include essential eleirents of the appellant's theory of the case. 
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 11 states as follows: 
The plaintiff claims that the defendant failed to 
exercise such required care, skill and diligence 
in the operation of the heart-lung by-pass machine, 
or in failing to properly train and supervise his 
perfusion pump technician. 
Such a staterrent is a wholly inadequate staterrent of the appellant's claims. 
The appellant has the right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury, 
but such an instruction, which purr:orted to set forth the appellant's claims 
failed to do so. 
The appellant clailred that the pump was not properly operated, but 
llDre irrportantly, the appellant clailred that the respondent and his purrp techni-
cian failed to properly rronitor the appellant while using the purrp rrachine. It 
is quite conceivable that the jury found that the pump was physically operated 
within the standard of care, but had they been so instructed, there was sufficient 
testinDny that they would have likely found that certain necessary precautions 
were not taken, arrong which were the following: 
l. Failure to properly obtain arterial and venous blood gas 
tests throughout the operation; 
2. Failure to properly rronitor the patient's terrperature. 
The court failed to instruct on the atove important theories of the 
appellant'.s case, and such failure oonstituted prejudicial error. 
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c. The trial court erred in failinq to c::ri· \re +-he 11 
- - w' apf.:e ant's 
requested instructions Nos. 6 and 7. 
The appellants requested the following instructions regardir: 
use of depositions in trial: 
Appellants requested Instruction No. 6: 
In the present action certain testirrony has been 
read to you by way of deposition. You are in-
structed that you are not to discount this testi-
rrony for the sole reason that it corres to you in 
the form of a deposition. It is entitled to t.11e 
sarre consideration on your part with reference to 
its weight as if the witness had r:ersonally apJ:>eared. 
Appellants requested Instruction No. 7: 
In the present action certain testirrony has been 
given to you by way video television. You are 
instructed that you are not to discount this 
testirrony for the sole reason that it corres to 
you in the fonn of a video television. It is 
entitled to t.'le sarre consideration on your part 
with reference to its weight as if the witness had 
personally appeared. 
For various reasons it is sometimes necessary to use deposit.le 
trial rather than live testirrony. It is likely that rrembers of the jur1' c 
tend to discount testirrony by deposition in comparison to live testi.Jror,y :: 
witnesses they can see and hear. However the ;:>arty offering testirrony t; 
deposition has t.11e right to have such testirrony weighed in the sarre ITBJll'.e: 
live testirrony. Testirrony by deposition should not be given greater or ;" 
consideration simply because it is testirrony by deposition and the jury s: 
properly be so instructed. 
In the instant case t.11e appellant offered testirrony by dejXlsit 
recorded both in written fonn and in video television form. The al:xlve re> 
instructions were particularly irrp:Jrtant vii th resr:;ect to U1e video dep::is;~ 
as such a rrianner of presenting evidence is a rather new and novel proceGC:' 
It is quite likely that rrernl::ers of tJ1e jur;, unless explicitly instrxw: 
otherwise, w:::iuld give less credibility to evidence seen on a tclevislon :: Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The appellant was entitled to an instruction on the use of deposision testi-
rrony, and the courts failure to so instruct prejudiced the appellant. 
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POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR HAVING REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE ANY HE: 
TEXT AS AUTHORITATIVE, THE TRIAL COuRT ERRED I:J REFCSI:;: 
ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TO AUTHENTICATE AUTHORITATI~: 
Near the outset of the trial, the plaintiff called the defer,c.;: 
Doctor Parrish, as an adverse witness. During the course of plaintiff': 
examination of the defendant doctors, i::>laintiff' s counsel questioned fa 
defendant doctor concerning medical text books authored by several ernins· 
heart surgeons. (R. 841-46) The defendant doctor evasively refused to;: 
ledge any of the experts or their medical texts. Indeed t..'Je trial cour: 
sistent'_-1- sustained objections to foundational questions which were c~~ 
goinq t:: ::.:-.e auti:entication of medical texts. (R. 841-46) Counsel for: 
plainti:f :::-e::ieatedly attempted to lay a foundation concerning several r.er 
but each time the trial =urt refused to allow such questions. CoW1Sel' 
plaintiff offered to niake a proffer of proof =ncerning authoritativene:: 
the medical texts in questions. (R. S46) Nevertheless the court refuse: 
allow plaintiff's counsel to pursue such a line of inquiry even thougn :: 
cross-e.."<amination of the defendant doctor. 
Later in the trial, counsel for plaintiff atteit\)ted to aut:hentJ: 
medical text books by testirrony from plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Char. 
Bailey. (R. 1379-1383) The trial court repeatedly refused to allow que:·-
as to the auth61ticity of prominent medical texts. (R. 1379-83) Counse: 
plaintiff t..'len made the following proffer: 
MR. DIXON: Your Honor, the plaintiff v.Duld like to proffer ~,: 
Court at this time that Dr. Bailey would have authenticated a number 0 ~ 
textbooks related to bypass surgery, extracorporeal circulation, surger, 
chest, and related matters that would all be textbooks which Dr· &nleJ :' 
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r.o 
l 
authenticate as being regarded as reliable authorities by himself and other 
physicians and that are generally accepted in the field as accurately reflecti 
the state of the art as of the tines that these were published. ng 
The plaintiff would have-or, the plaintiff proposed to authenticate 
them through this witness so that the textbooks could be used in cross-examin-
ation of defense witr_iesses l.!1asmuch as it's quite apparent that Dr. Parrish is 
unwilling to authenticate anything. 
And Dr. Parrish has no textbooks of any =ent value, m::ist of his 
text]::x::Dks relating back to before 1960. 
I'll be happy if the Court would like to bring in all of the textbooks 
and--
THE ffiURI': The proffer is in the record. The Court's ruling rerrains 
t.he sarre in connection with the matter, Mr. Dixon. 
It is quite apparent from the record that counsel for the plaintiff 
intended to use authoritative rredical texts for purposes of cross-examination of tn 
defendant doctor and the defendant doctor's experts. The refusal of the defendant, 
Dr. Parrish, to authenticate any of the standard texts on heart by-pass surgery 
is clearly docurrented. In the face of such recalcitrance, counsel for plaintiff 
attempted to authenticate these rredical texts through his own expert, but was 
not allowed to do so. Had the appellant been allowed to use the texts in question 1_ 
on cross-examination, he would have shown that the respondent doctor was negliyent 
in performing,as he did, the by-pass surgery on Mr. Jenkins. The trial court's 
refusal to allow counsel for the appellant to question the respondent concern.inc; 
the authenticity of medical texts was prejudicial error. Likewise, the trial l. 
court' s refusal to allow appellant to then authenticate rredical texts by his 
own expert witness constituted prejudicial error and denied the appellant a 
fair trial. 
The traditional rule is that rredical texts are not admissible to prove 
the truth of staterrents contained therein, but the use of rredical texts in 
cross-examining rredical experts is aJ.rrost universally recognized. 6 Wigm::ire, 
Evidence, (3rd ed. 1940) §§1690-1700; M:Connick, Evidence, §296; 60 ALR. 2d, 77 
Even in the states still clinging to the traditional approach, an expert 
witness may be cross -examined to determine whether or not he recognizes certain :>. 
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·rredical texts or treatises as aG.thori tati ve. If t.".e expert recugnizes t'.; 
or treatise as authoritati'1e, that text or treatise may then be used to. 
'I 
diet, impeach and discredit the witness. 
In the instant case, as pointed out al::ove, counsel for appell~·: · 
not even allowied to ask the respondent doctor, wr.o is an expert, fol1'lciat· 
---------.:::. 
questions as to the aut.1-1entici ty of certain rredical texts, let alone whet 
r2sponC.ent doctor considered such texts to be authoritative. (R. 841-8% i. 
even under t.'ie strictest a;::iplicatior. of the traditional rule regarding c:,, 
of rredical texts, the trial court wrongfully and prejudicially cut off t.o 
examination of the respondent doct'Jr. 
Since t.lJ.e trial court effectively blocked all cross-2xaminatior. 
respondent doctor by the use of rredical texts in that it allowed him to::: 
to concede w'.1et~'ier a te}.'t was authoritative or not, counsel for the plai1:.~ 
attempted ta au":.':.enticate the rredical texts through his own eXJ:.-'€rt witneso. 
This t.'ie trial :::oel..-':.: re::used to allow, apparently ar;::ilying the traditiona:. 
concerning the manner in which rredical texts may be authenticated. A gre.o' 
many courts are increasingly breaking away from strict a:;iplication of fr.2: 
tional rule regarding authentication of rredical texts and their use inc:: 
examination of rredical experts. The United States Suprerre Court lons asc 
rejected the rigid traditional approach in the case of Reil1': v. Pinkus, :: 
U.S. 269 (1949). In Reilly the appellant was not allowed to use for pur,x; 
of cross-examination, certain rredical texts which were otherwise shown tM 
reliable, because the respondent's expert witnesses refused to authenuc.;::I 
In granting a new trial, the Court said: 
" ... It has been pointed out that the doctors' expert 
evidence rested on their general professional knowledge. 
To some extent their knowledge was acquired from rredlcal. 
textbcDks and publications, on which these experts placec 
reliance. In cross-examination resVJi~-:::ent sought to 
question these witnesses concerning staterrents in other 
medical bocks some of which at least were shown tote 
, ·ue;. 
respectable aut.lJ.ori ties. T'ne questions wiere not rermi 
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We think this.was an undue restriction on the right 
to cross-exanune. It certainly is illogical, if not 
actually unfair, to permit witnesses to give ex;:iert 
opuuons based on l::x:::ok knowledge, and then deprive 
the.party challe~ging such evidence of all opportunity 
to interrogate tnem al:::out divergent opinions expressed 
in other reputable l::x:::oks." (388 U.S. 269, 275) 
A large number of state courts have, either by judicial decision or 
state statute, rejected the strict application of the traditional rule and 
adopted the !:Jrocedure of allowing cross-examination by use of rredical texts 
authenticated either by another expert witness or authenticated by judical 
notice. See, for exanple, Illinois: Darling v. Charleston Corrrnunity r~rial 
Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E. 2d 253 (1965); Nebraska: Oliverius v. Wisks, 
107 Neb. 821, 187 N.W. 73 (1922); Texas: William Caireron Conpany v. D:>wning, 
Ct. Civ. Appls., 147 S.W. 2d, 963 (1941); Washington: Dabroe v. Rhodes, 64 Wash. 
431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964); Florida: City of St. Petersburg v. Ferguson, Dis. Ct. 
ll_ppls. 2d, 193 So. 2d 648 (1967). In addition, the Hawaii oourt has indicated 
that it will establish such a rule when the issue is properly brought before it: 
Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 53 H. 526, 497 P.2d 1354; and Michigan has indicated a willing-
ness to allow authentication by judicial notice: Jones v. Bloom, 388 Mich. 98, 
200 N.'.J. 2d 196. The following states have adopted the nore flexible approach by 
statute: i-Jevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. §51.255 (1973)); l~ew Mexico (N.M. Stat. §20-4-
803(18)(1973)); Maine (Me. R. Evid. 803(18)(1976)); Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. §908.0. 
(18) (1975)); Kansas (Kan. Stat. §60-460(cc) (1964)). The federal courts allow 
cross-examination by use of rredical texts which have been authenticated by other 
expert wit.cesses or by judicial notice. Federal Rules of Evidence 803(18) and 
both the ~.ad.el Code of Evidence (Rule 529) and t..'"1e Uniform Code of Evidence 
(Rule 63(31)) have embraced such an approach. 
The traditional justification for not allowing the freeer use of rredical 
texts, especially to prove the truth of the matter as asserted, is that quotations 
from texts constitutes hearsay. In turn, the principal concern about hearsay 
· l · abl In the case of authoritative uedica 
evidence in general is that it is unre l e. 
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texts, the concern al::x:Jut reliability is substantially negated by other'" 
guards. These include the fact that the authors of texts have no · t _ in eres: 
the outcome of the litigation at hand and are therefore unbiased; the :u: 
are professional persons who write for their peers and are concerned al:xi1.: 
their reputation for accuracy and·· authenticity arrong their peer group; t 
texts in question must be authenticated in the courtr=m by qualified e;'¥. 
As a result of these considerations many courts allow, upon authenticahc: 
medical texts to be used on direct evidence to prove the truth of the mt 
asserted. See, e.g. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (18); Nevada Rev;;, 
Statutes §51.255 (1973); New Mexico Statute §20-4-803 (18) (1973); Maine P. 
of Evidence 803 (18) (1976); Alabama Code Title 7 §413 (1960). On balance, .. 
t.'1e safeguards to reliability are considered, the advantages gained in er£: 
the veracity of expert witnesses through the use of medical texts, far cut. 
the ccnce:!:Tls a.tcut reliability. 
Ct:a!: has already adopted a statute t.'1at allows for historical wvr 
books of science or art etc. to be accepted as prima facia evidence of far. 
general notoriety (§78-25-6 Utah Code Annotated). One of the requirerrents 
this code section is that the author of the texts in question must have Ce. 
"indifferent between the parties [to the litigation] ". Medical .texts oer.i. 
qualify. Additionally medical texts are works of science. Ct:her states ''· 
identical statutes, have alloY."ed technical medical information to be intrcc 
by virtue of such a statute. In Julian v. Barker, et al. 7 5 Idaho 415, 21: 
719 (1954), interpreting Idaho Code §9-402 (1948), the court allowed affill'' 
evidence to be submitted concerning a drug manufacturers instructions alxJcc 
use of a certain medicine; and in In re Sultan, 83 Id. 265, 361 P.2d 793 1 ~ 
. . 1 · hi t: ,_; ,,,,.,n" Unde: t.'1e court allowed a w1 t:..'l.ess to quote rredica texts in s _es"-"-''~ 1 • 
M:Jntana Revised Code §93-1101..:.3 (1964) the court in ~us~ 
District, 565 P.2d 632 (19771 allowed as evidence a U.S. Geological re0Jr' 
--
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the aJ:;ove example, evidence ITDre technical than general notcriet:z was allowed. 
AlabaITB, under a code section similar to Utah Code Annotated §78-25-6 has 
long allowed the use of rredical texts, in ooth direct and cross-examination. 
These jurisdictions have recognized the great advantages gained in checking 
the veraci t:z of exi:;ert witnesses by allowing the freeer use of rredical texts 
in direct and cross-examin.ation and have used statutes similar to or identical 
with Utah' s to achieve such an end. 
In the instant case, the respondent doctor was allowed tc insulate 
himself fran effective cross-examination by the use of authoritative and reliabl' 
texts by sirrply refusing tc concede that any texts were authoritative. The 
trial court aided the respondent's efforts to insulate himself by refusing tc 
allow the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Bailey, tc authenticate rredical texts. In so 
doing, the court unwarrantedly and unfairly restricted the appellant's ability 
to cross-examination the respondent doctor and his rredical expert witnesses, 
and in so doing denied the appellant a fair trial. 
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POINT VI 
REVERS IBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY 'I'HE TRIAL COCRT IN 
ALLOWING A SURPRISE W~TNESS, DR. RUSSELL M. NELSON, TO 
TESTIFY, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PRE-TRAL ORDER. IT WAS 
ALSO REVERSIBLE ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
ALLOW DR. NELSON TO RENDER AN OPINION ON MATTERS OTHER 
THAN REBUTTAL TO THE TESTIMONY OF CHARLES DYSON. 
A. Dr. Russel M. Nelson, was called as a surprise wi. tness by -
defense, and in so doing, not only surprised unfairly the Plaintiff, but\·. 
the pre-trial order. 
In anticipation of the trial of the above-entitled rratter, a ,r, 
ccnfero...nce was held before the Honorable Judge Ernest Baldwin, in his char" 
on September 12, 1977. Although no written rrerrorandum of Judge Baldwin'>: 
tri.h order was prepared, he nevertheless did make an order requiring eacr 
party to disclose all witnesses who w::iuld be called at trial. (R. 494,49i; 
Affidavit of attorney for plaintiff paragraph 3a. This fact is further :X: 
by staterrents of counsel during the trial (R. 1737-1740). 
The appellant disclosed witnesses pursuant to the ;::ire-trial ort 
did the respondent's counsel. However, during the course of the trial, t"' 
in contravention to the controlling pre-trial order, penni tted the restxinri 
counsel to call an exi;:ert rredical witness, not disclosed at pre-trial, tot; 
on direct examination. As a result of this violation of the pre-trial di:: 
requirement, the Plaintiff was unfairly and prejudicially surprised, not r; 
had the opportunity to make discover1, through deposition or other.vise, on 
-44-
-
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witness. In addition, the Plaintiff was prejudiced in that he did not have an 
oppcrtunity to fully investigate Dr. Nelson's credentials and qualifications, 
analyze the theories of his expert testirrony, nor procure rebuttal witnesses. 
Even at the tirre of the comrencerrent of the trial, when t.1-ie court required of 
tx:Jth appellant' s and respondent' s counsel the naJTeS of the witnesses they 
intended to call, counsel for the respondent did not include or. Russel M. 
Nelson in his list of witnesses (R. 659 and R. 660) . Consequently the judge 
never inquired as to whether rrembers of the jury knew of Dr. Russel M. Nelson 
(R. 677). One of the evils that resulted is that there rray have been rrembers 
of the jury who knew Dr. Nelson or who knew of him, and counsel had no oppor-
tunity to te appraised of this fact or make further inquiry into that rratter. 
Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1967), presents a case very 
s:Unilar to the present one. In Bertram, a pre-trial order was made requiring 
the parties to disclose witnesses, but as in the instant case, no written order 
was issued. During the trial, the appellant called a witness that had not been 
disclosed as required by the pre-trial order. The trial court properly refused 
to allow the witness to testify. The appellant appealed the court's ruling, but 
upon review it was held that the witness was properly excluded.. The court held 
that no fornal pre-trial order requiring the exchange of witness lists was 
necessary. As long as the pre-trial judge required the exchange of lists, such 
an order, even if not fornalized into a pre-trial order, controlled the calling 
of witnesses at tiral. 
In Fairbanks Publishing Conpany v. Fransisco, 390 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1964) 
a pre-trial conference was held at which ti.Ire the parties were required to ex-
change witness lists. At the ti.Ire of trial the Plaintiff attenpted to call 
witnesses not included in the list as required. The Defendant made a tinEly 
objection. The rratter was extensively argued in the trial court with the trial 
judge eventually ruling that either party could call witnesses other than those 
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included in the pre-trial order. The Alaskan Court held that such an 
abandorurent of the pre-trial order by the trial judge was error and the 
defendant was prejudiced thereby. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiff made a a:mplete disclosur; 
all witnesses called by him, and made a tirrely objection at trial to th; 
of witnesses not disclosed as required at the pre-trial ccnference (R, ;· 
41). Dr. Nelson was not named as a witness by the defense and should nc: 
been allrn.;oed to testify. Dr. Nelson's testi.rrony unfairly and prejWi.ci:.._ 
surprised the appellant. He had no cpportmity to prepare for such tes::.. 
examine Dr. Nelson's qualifications, obtain disccvery of Dr. Nelson's t:r. 
or rrethods of practice, nor obtain rebuttal testi.rrony. Dr. Nelson's teo: 
was a clear case of "trial by ambush," the very thing pre-trial confere. 
are designed to prevent. 
3. The trial ccurt erred in failing to restrict Dr. Nelson'' 
testi.'TOr.y to rebuttal to Mr. Charles Dyson's testi.rrony. 
At the t.irre the defense called Dr. Russel Nelson to testify, : 
appellent entered an objection based upon the grounds enurrerated al:ove. 
1738-41) . A ccnference was held out of the hearing of t.tie jurf and the 1 
was argued. The court ruled that Dr. Nelson v.Duld be strictly limited tr 
rebuttal to the testi.rrony of Mr. Charles Dyson. However, t.11e court fai:e 
to restrict Dr. Nelson' s testi.rrony to rebuttal, and Dr. Nelson was, in ~': 
allowed to give his opinion as to the entire question of the standard of! 
and other matters (R. 1735-47) . 
It is well recognized that in the rare case that it be<XJireS r<:J 
to rrodify a pre-trial order at the tirre of trial for the purpose for pre' 
a rranifest injusitce, the trial must impose restrictions to protect the 
-46-
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pa;:ties. ::Bnd v · 1'-ir Carrier Engine Service, Inc. , 263 F. 2d 948 (5th Cir. 
1959). See also '.'Jote, Federal Pre-trial Procedure, 51 Georgetown L.J. 309 
(1963). Lri Land v. Carrier, ~' the court said: 
''The Court does have the right. . . to relieve 
counsel of pre-trial stipulations to prevent 
rre.nifest injustice ... but the =urt is responsible 
for seeing that suitable protective terms or 
conditions are i.mj:osed to prevent substantial and 
real harm to the adversary. ***Whatever form it 
takes, the protection must be as full as needed 
to assure that the authorized change does not 
subject the adversary to insuperable and irretriev-
able harm." at 953. 
The trial court failed to so protect the appellant, as required. After 
having ruled that Mr. Nelson's testim:my would be limited to rebuttal to 
Mr. Charles Dyson, he was, over objection (R. 1737-41), allowed to testify 
as a general defense witness and was permitted to answer a hypothetical 
question relating to the general liability of the defendant. Such 
testirrony was prejudicial to the appellant, and denied him a fair trial. 
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TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF TEE 
RIGHT TO ;o.. FULL AND FAIR CROSS-EX;o.JUN.:'.\TION. 
-"'· A party has a right to a full and fair cross-examination or. 
all matters examined on direct ... 
It is a l::esic rule of law that a party has the right to confrcr.: 
cross-examination, any witness who is called to testify against him. ~ 
U.S., 282 U.S. 687 (1931); Resurrection Gold Min. Co. v. FortllI'.e Gold :tr .. 
129 F. 668 (8th Cir. 1904); State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 104J 
(1927); McCormick on Evidence, 2d Ed. Sl9; Wiamore, Evidence S1367; 81 ;y, 
2d, Witnesses S464. For the past two hundred years, comron law judges ar.: 
attorneys alike have regarded cross-examination as "an essential safeguar: 
the accuracy and completeness of testirrony ... ". ~.cCormick, ~, §19, 
ca.lls it the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of tr:. 
and states further that "Cross-examination, not trial by jury, is the gro-2: 
pe:rar.er.t contribution of the _;;nglo-.l\rrerican system of law to ~rove rret:I 
of trial procedure." Wigrrore, supra, 81367. Because of the inp:::lrtance oi 
corss-examination as a vehicle for the discovery of truth in a judicial 
:oroceedi~g, virtually all courts of last resort in the United States reco: 
cross-examination as a right and nor a mere privilege. see e.g. Statev. 
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927); Fahy v. Clark, 125 conn. 41, 
3 A.2d 313 (1938); 81 .~ .. Jr. 2d, Witnesses e464, n. 49, 50 & 51. 
Utah courts have long recognized cross-examination to l::e a riglt 
not a rrere privilege. State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (192'. 
involved a criminal defendant who had teen given a suspended sentence. At 
subsequent hearing, the trial court set aside the suspended sentence r~ 
the defendant to serve his term. l,t. the hearing to revoke his suspended 
--
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~er,tence, the defendar:t was not allowed to cross-ev~~' ~e the stat ' · tn 
- ~''-'-" e s Wl esses. 
In overturning the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court said: "In a 
judicial investigation the right of cross-examination is an absolute right and 
no,t a mere privilege of the party against whom the witness is called." ~ 
v. Zolantakis, ~, at 1047. More recent Utah decisions continue to affinn 
that cross-examination is a right and not a mere privilege. see e.g. State v. 
[.~estas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977). 
While a party has a right to cross-examine any witness who gives 
testi..rrony against him, the trial court is, of course, given a great deal of 
discretion as to the scope of the cross-examination. Alford v. U.S., 382 
c.s. 687 (1930); State v. ZOlantakis, 70 Utah 2966, 259 P.1044 (1927); Weber. 
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 802 (1959). 
This is necessarily so, as a trial judge must reasonably have control of the 
order of proof, the length of trial, and the protection of witnesses from unduly 
prolix cross-examination that serves little in the aid of the discovery of 
truth. Alford v. U. s. , supra; Resurrection Gold Min. Co. v. Fortune Gold Min. 
Co., 129 F. 668 (8th Cir. 1904). Thus, even in jurisdictions such as Utah, 
which follow the rule that only trose rratters examined on direct may be the 
subject of cross-examination, trial judges rray, in their discretion, allow a 
cross-examination to go into collateral rratters instead of requiring the 
cross-examiner to call the witness as his own and elecit testirrony in the fonn 
of direct testirrony. Resurrection Gold Min., supra. This is done quite 
frequently, and such discretionary action on the part of the trial judge will 
l::e overturned only for abuse of such discretion. 81 Arn. Jur. 2d Witnesses 8479. 
Ihe trial judge rray also, in his discretion, limit the cross-examination of a 
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• 
rnaliciously discredit the wi.tr.ess .. :..lford v. U . .":., supra. It has even~ 
held that the trial ccurt rnay, in his discretion, set a time li_n,it to CQ': 
the cross-examination of a witness, wnen the cross-exarrination has l::EcarE 
unduly long, has not produced any isnp::irtant, new or qualifying facts, ar.c. 
does not appear that continued cross-examination along the line pursued 
1
,1. 
produce any new or qualifying fact that would be helpful to the jcry. 
t-:.arris v. U.S., 350 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1965). P.owever, since cross-exar:i:, 
is such a p::iwerful and useful cteck on the veracity, accuracy and inipart::_ 
of the witness, it is generally stated that a trial judge should give t~e 
cross-exarniner wide latitude in his cross-exarPination. !"esurrection C-<lk 
Min. Co .. supra; .<U+=ord v. U.S., supra, at 219. Certainly cross-eX2I11inat.: 
sro:.:;ld :-1ot 0-e stepped ·,.,r.en it reasonably appears to be leading to the disC'. 
of truth er L~rtant additional facts. State v. Peek, 1 Ctah 2d 263, 26i 
P.2d 630 (1953). Clearly, it would be an abuse of discretion to halt crcs: 
examination on material matters that the witness went into on direct. ~~ 
Pasin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959): 
Am Jur. 2d Witnesses §478. Indeed, the trial court has discretion to lil:r 
the cross-examination only after the cross-examination on each rraterial~-
covered by the •Ni tness on direct. Alford v. U.S. , ~, at 219. To cut: 
cross-examination on any material p::iint ccvered. on direct before it has ::eo 
fully developed, or to forbid all cross-exam.nation on any rraterial fXJir.t ._, 
was the subject of direct examination is plain error. l'J.ford, supra; 
,_, Such error wi· 11, in rost Ressurrection, ~; 2tate v. Zolantaiu.s_, supra. 
cases, rrandate a new trial. ."J.ford v. T]. s. , supra, at 220; Fahy v · Cl§rt· 
Conn. 41, 3 1'2d 313 (1938); McCormick on Evidence §19, at 46 (2d ecJ.). 
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In Alford v · U · S · , ~' the Suprerre Court overtUined the conviction 
of the defendant tecause the trial court forl:::ade all cross-examination in a 
lec;it.: .. mate area of inquiry. In that case the trial court sustained the govern-
;'.'€P.t' s objection to all questions concerning a witness's place of residence . 
. ~fter enunciating the general principle that "Cross-examination of witness is 
a :ratter of right," and that, "Lilt is the essence of a fair trial that 
reasc~able latitude 1Je given the cross-examiner ..• ," the court stated: 
The extent of cross-examination wi.th resi;-ect to an 
appropriate subject. of inquiry is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. It may exercise a 
reasonable judgment in determining when the subject. 
is exhausted. ***But here the trial court cut off 
all inquiry on a subject. with respect to which the 
defense was entitled to a reasonable cross-examina-
tion. This was an abuse of disc:cetion and prejudicial 
error. (at 219 & 20). 
illus, while the court has discretion to limit the extent of the cross-
eX2mination of any appropriate line of questioning on a particular subject 
watter, it does not have the right to forbid all cross-examination on a 
subject of appropriate inquiry, until it has teen fully and fairly covered. 
In Ressurection Gold Min. Co. v. Fortune Gold Min. Co., 129 F. 
668 (8th Cir. 1904), that court extensively analyzed both the right of a 
party to a full and fair cross-examination and the discretionary control of 
the trial court with regard to the scoi;-e thereof. During cross-examination 
of plaintiff's witness, the trial court, in Ressurection, refused to allow a 
question which '1ias directly related to facts testified to by the witnesses, 
which, if answered, may have proved the witness to have teen mistaken in his 
direct testirrony. On appeal, counsel for plaintiff argued that permission 
to answer such question was discretionary with the trial court and that 
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refusal to allow the questior. v.-as r:c "!Guse of disc.::-etior.. "'."he c:rC'Jlt. 
held otherNise, stating: 
But a fair and full cross-examination of a witness 
upon the subjects of his examination in chief is the 
absolute right, and r.ot the rrere privilege, of the 
party against whcrn he is called and denial of this 
right is a prejudicial and fatal error. It is only 
after the right has been fully and substantiallv 
exercised that the allowance of the cross-exami~ation 
becanes discretionar1 with the trial court. 
Resurrection, supra, at 674. 
The court, in Resurrection, goes on to consider the propriety. 
going into :mtters on cross-ex-c.mination that were not part of the 'Nl.tr.eo: 
testirrony in chief during direct examination. The court points out tmt 
this is done, the witness becorres the witness of the cross-exarnir.rng iz-
It is at this point that the trial court's reasonable discretion cares;: 
play. ;..s the court states: 
It is d~scretionary with the court to pennit the cross-
examiner to rrake the W1. tness his own at the tisre he is 
conductir.g the cross-examination, because the tL'11e and 
the :earner of the trial are within the discretion of the 
::ocrt. It is a.lso discretionary with the trial court to 
penr~t leading questions to be put to a hostile witness 
upon rQS direct examination. (at 675) 
This, it is in this area t1:at the trial court properly exercises his reF 
discretion. When the speed and efficiency of the trial is enhanced by 2: 
the cross-examiner latitude to go sanewhat beyond the witness's testi.rror.v 
chief, the trial judge, wh:l is in the best position to know this, may aL: 
This rule is ever. rrore succintly stated by Judge f-look in his concurring 
opinion in Resurrection, supra. P.e states: 
The position of Judge Thayer and the writer of this 
opinion is that after a cross-examining party has 
teen accorded all of this rights as limited by the 
rule Llimiting cross-e~nation to the subject of 
the direct exaJY!inatioDJ, whether the cross-examina-
tion rray then take a Wl.der sccpe or latitude is 
generally a matter within the sound discretion of the 
52 
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trial court, and error is not camtitted unless such 
a discretion is abused. ***That a trial court is given 
a broad discretion in controlling the latitude of a 
cross-€xamir,ation has become an axiom of the practice. 
Eesurrection, supra, at 681. (errphasis added) See 
also Judge Eook's full discussion of this point at 
pages 681-684. 
\~rule the court rrakes it clear that great discretion is given the trial judge 
to allow cross-€xamination beyond the scope of the direct, as long as the 
cross-€X2I!'iner is pursuing subjects opened by the direct examination, the 
right to a full and fair cross-€xarrination on each such subject is "invaluable, 
and it should be carefully preserved." Eesurrection, supra, at 675. 
During tre course of the trial, the defendant called an expert 
witness, Dr. Eussel ~1. Nelson, M.r::., to testify as to the ccmnunity standard 
of care wi t..'1 respect to the rroni toring of blood flow purrped by a heart-lung 
T!lachine. Dr. r::elson was th::Jroughly examined by counsel for defendant on 
direct exa.'Tl.ination, as to that standard, including hypothetical questions 
eliciting his opinion as to 'Nhat is and is not proper medical procedure, as 
practiced by the doctors in this corrmunity, in relation to the proper rronitoring 
of said rr.achine. (Tr. p. 1735-1747). On cross-€xarnination, counsel for the 
plaintiff asked the following question: 
Q. Dr. Nelson, you've indicated that you r.ave an 
opL.""lion based on the camruni ty standard. Did 
you perfonn surgery in the sarre way that was 
described in that hypothetical? (Tr. p. 1747). 
Col.ll1sel for defendant objected on the grounds that the question was "irrelevant 
and i.rmaterial." such an objection is with::Jut rrerit. As is clear fran the 
cases and auth::Jrities examined above, a party has a right to a full and 
canplete cross-€xamination on all rraterial points examined on direct. 
question objected to went to the heart of the witness's testirrony, the 
c ') _ 
The 
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standard of care by which the ce:'encant' s =r.duct "'cs to C:e judged. 
~:evertheless, the objection was er:-oneoesly sustair.ed, and t!-.e plair.t::: 
vraS, t!ierccy, C.enied the right to a, full and fair cross-exar.inatio:: 
rrost pertir.ent subject of the witness's dir~ testiror.y. 
E. The question propounded to Dr. :Jelsor. is clearly retenal ::: 
releva.":t. 
Since the question objected to was asked or. cross-exai"T\ir:atior., : 
rrost fur:.Car.ental inquiry regardi..'1g the relev-or.cy of the testi.-rony soi.:<;t:: ,, 
already been consicered ai:ove, that is, whatever was t.'"ie subject of t!-.e 
wit.'1ess' s testi..-rony on direct is a legiti.TTate area of inqctry on cross-
e.~.ination. The cross-e:xcrr.ining party r.ot only has a right to c;;o u:tc c.-. 
such sueject rretter fully ar..d. canpletely, he should C:e given great latlt.i: 
in so doir.;. ;.lford, supra, and E<.esurrection Gold Yiin., supra. F<Jwever,' 
the objection v..-as stated to be Ca.sed on a lack of rreteriallty and relevar:= 
an ar..alysis of the standarc of rreteriality and relevancy is appropriate, 
Traditionally a distinction r.as 'ceen :rade bet,-een r:-atenahty ::. 
relevancy. :'he question of rrateriali ty gees to •kether the testirror.y 
elicited relates to a rratter in issue. .:-'.cCor.:Uck on E:Vi:::!.ence, at 434 (2:: 
Relevancy relates to whether evicence is prote.ti ve, that ls ·Nhethe:- it te:~ 
to prove or disprove a fact in issue. ~k:Cor.rick, ~· at 434. Tr.us, 
evidence needs to be l:oth related to facts in issue and tend to, L'1 soce" 
prove or disprove one of trose facts. This distinction between the tem 
materiality and relevancy is articulated less frequently today, but tl:e :<:· 
kind of analysis is :rade: evidence clearly ~st be related to r.-etters ir. 
issue and tend to prove or disprove such i'\Otters. 2? .;:rr .. Jur 2d, ~ 
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::or:versely, unless excluded by sorr.e specific rule of exclusion (i· e p " 
.. , .ear_ay 
~cle, 2€st Evidence Rule, etc.) , all evidence of facts and circumstances 
tendJr.g to prove or disprove any proposition which is in issue is properly 
acir:u.ssi ole and sue!-; evidence :rn.J.St not te exchrled. Foster v. Keatino, 120 
c.;. .. 2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953); PDle v. Eole, 76 C.A. 2d 344, 172 P.2d 936 
'.l946); Eerkshire v. P.arerr, 181 O.R. 42, 178 P.2d 133 (1947); Keeney v. City 
of ::'1edand Park, 203 I<"an. 389, 454 P.2d, 456 (1969). 
Tr1e testiroc:ny sought l:;y the question clearly relates to a rratter in 
issue; llldeed it relates t.'"ie single :cost irrporc.ant issue in a rredical rralpractice 
case: the establism.ent of the corrrnunity standard of care. The standard of 
care is wi trout a doubt the single rrost irrportant consideration in proving er 
disprovir.g liability in a rredical rralpractice case. HJw physicians in the 
carrnuni ty perform the rredical procedure in question determines the standard of 
care. ~e witness is a practicing physician engaged in the same specialty as 
t:-ie defendant and practices in the sarre corrrnunity. Hew tr.e witness perfonns 
t!'.e rredical procedure in question clearly relates to the CO!Tilll.ll".ity standard of 
care ar..d, therefore, clearly relates to a "rratter in issue." The evidence 
scught is rraterial. 
The question, likewise, is probative on the issue of the a::mmm.ity 
standard of care, that is, the answer to the question would tend to eit.'"ier 
prove or disprove the standard of care the defendant was attenpting to establish 
•,.Ii.th the witness. If the witness had testified that he performed the rredical 
procedure in question in the sarre rranner he described as the standard of care 
in tt:e carmur.i ty, that would give greater weight to the establishrent of that 
standard. If, on the other hand, he testified tli.at his practice was different 
than the standard des=ibed by him as the ccrnmmity standard, a wl'Dle new line 
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of questioning would te appropriate. If the new line of qJestionrng est.a;: 
that the witness's own practice reflects a higher standard of care, the!: 
ought to l::e made aware of that fact1 as such fact, would, unless explair.e' 
tend to lessen the witness's testi..'TOny regarding the proper · COITTTI\.lru_ ty stc;~ 
The fact that the question was asked of an expert on cross-eXilrrr 
adds a further dirrension to the question of relevancy. It is generally 
recognized that the standard of relevancy is applied less strictly on cm 
examination tran on direct. 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witr.esses §476; McCo.nnick on 
Evidence, §29 (2d ed.). Thus, it is widely held that any question which•, 
to explain, =ntradict, or discredit the evidence offered by a witr,ess, er 
serves to test his accuracy, rrerrory, veracity, credibility, or ~ialit 
is proper or-, =oss-exarnination, even though irrelevant or r-errote. Weter i 
Water Conserrcr.cv I;ist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 802 (1959); 81.:.-
Jur. 2d, Witnesses §476, 484. The effectiveness of cross-exanunationasc 
prol:e into these areas is "the principal factor in establishing crnss-
examination as one of the chief agencies for the developnent of truth m 
judicial inquiries." Further, "cross-examination is not confined to the 
identical details testified to in chief, but extends to its entire subject 
matter, and to all matters that rray rrodify, supplerrent, contradict, rebut, 
or make clearer the facts testified to in chief by the 1vitness." 81 ~m. J.' 
Witnesses IM81. Utah cases recognized such areas of inquiry as the inter.& 
purpose of cross-exarni."'lation. In Weber Basis i-;ater C'.onservancy Distri.fLJ 
10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959), the court rever-sed the trial judge wrr 
did not allow responcient to s11fficiently cross-exarrine in these legitimate 
In so doing, the =urt stated: 
The purpose of cross-exarnination is to give adversary 
=unsel the opportunity not only to ir.qoJ.ire into uncertainties 
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relating to the testirrony in chief, but to test its 
credibility. vmatcver rray tend to explain, m:xl.ify 
or contradict that direct evidence should be allowed. 
~eter Basin, suora, at 864-65. (See also State v. Peek.) 
Thi.:.s, questions that would be objectionable on the basis of irrelevancy 
if asked on direct, are proper when asked on cross, if the questions are 
reasonably designed to elicit testirrony which tends to explain, m:xJ.ify, or 
contradict the witness's direct testirrony, or to serve to test his accuracy, 
:rerrory, veracity or irrpa.rtiality. 
Even greater latitude must be given in the cross~xarnination of 
an expert ·...ritness who has given testirrony based on his expert opinion. 31 
.:\m. Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence §45, 48. l-ny question which tests the 
accuracy and value of the witness's opinion or credibility is proper on 
cross~xamination. Coca-Cola v. ~bor, 246 F 842 (8th Cir. 1917); State v. 
Peek, 1 litah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953). Thus, in 31 Am. Jur. 2d, ~ 
and Ooinion Evidence 848, it states: 
A liberal range of examination is allowed touching 
all rratters testified to in chief, or tending to test 
the aualification, skill, or knowledge of the witness 
and the accuracy or value of his opinion. ***The 
cross~xamination of an expert witness is not confined 
to the specific questions and details of the direct 
examination. 'The witness rray be tested on the basis 
of any pertinent additional fact that the cross~xaroiner 
rray see fit to cover, or rrey be called upon to answer 
hypothetical questions pertinent to the inquiry. 
***The data on which an expert witness rests his specific 
opinion, as distinguished fran the knowledge whi~h . 
qualifies him to offer one at all, rrey be fully inquired 
into upon cross~.xamination. Inquiry rray be rrede into 
the reasons for the witness's opinion, and the rrethods 
by which he arrived at his conclusions, the difference 
between his opinion and other experts, as well as errors 
of opinion which he has rrade in other similar cases. 
31 Am. Jur. 2d, supra at 848 (errphasis added.) 
-57-
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In the instant case, the obvious intent of the propounded que,t., 
"'2.S to test the accuracy and validity, of the witness's opinion and atter;t 
rrodify, contradict, and, if possible, rebut the expert witness's opini'" O,, 
concerning the comm.mi ty standard of care. The purpose and intent of fa , 
question clearly falls within the proper J::ounds of cross-examination, ir.C; 
it is the classic situation for which cross-exarnination is so ur_iquely s::: 
as a tool of judicial inquiry. The witness has testified extensively or. 
direct examination as to the carrnuni ty standard of care, he r.as given hls 
opinion as to wrat he tr.inks the standard is, and has answered hy:;othetk 
questions put to hi.rn by the party which has paid him to testify, •,;hich 
questions are asked of him based on the fact that he is a rredical speciaL 
engaged ir: t1-.e sane speciality as the defendant doctor, and practicing l!. 
the sar.ie carmuru ty. If justice ever begged a char.ce to test the accuraq 
a 1-Jitness' s opinion, to scrutinize in detail the data on "hlch that opir.i: 
is based, and the factors considered in fonning it, to inquire into poss1:. 
bias or irTpartiality, in short, to have the opportunity to fully and 
rorrpletely rrake inquiry into all areas which can reasonably be exrected to 
rrod.ify or, in sar.e "'2.Y, contradict the witness ' s testirrony, it is in just 
such a situation. If the witness had been required to answer, and were tc , 
have answered that his practice conformed to the standard he testifiedtc 
his testirrony would have been strengtr.ened. If the witness were tor.ave 
answered that his practice differed from the standard he described to th: ' 
jury as the proper standard, then the jury ought to know in what respect:; 
practice differed, why his practice differed, if other doctors in tte are: 
pracriced in conforiri.ty with the witness's practice; if sc, how rrany: H 
why not? If the wi.tness had answered that his practice were different, a 
-58-
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new li::1e of questioning then tecomes relevant and legitirrate cross-examination. 
?laintiff was r.ot allowed to go into this iJilxlrtant line of questioning, which 
exan-ination ver1 reasonably could te expected to m:Jdify or even rebut the 
test:urony given by the 'Nitness; the court ruled in limine tr.at no cross-
exan-ination in this area would l::.e allowed. As in Alford, supra, Resurrection 
G:Jld Min., ~. v,'eter Easin Water, supra, and in Zolantakis, supra, the 
plaintiff ~o..s denied, at the outset, all cross-examination into an area that 
·.-ias, by all standards, rra.terial, relevant and legi tirrate cross-examination. 
Plaintiff had a right to fully and fairly cross-examine the defendant's 
exp::rt witness in this area, and denial of that right was prejudicial and 
reversible error. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and upon the grounds outlined above, tf.e 
appellant respectf'.llly urges the Court to reverse the judgrnc· 
of the court below and remand this case for a ~ew trial 
~ . 
Respectfully submitted this /S day of January, 1979. 
4{~:'/.J~e>u 
Ma den G. Dixon, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-,:;ppi 
1900 North Canyon Road 
Suite 304 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-.:'\ppell: 
to David w. Slagle, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 7~ F~ 
Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this· 
day of January, 1979. 
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Appendix "A" 
~ :n :1lifor.i.1. 
I 
I 
I 
I ·; <?'" ., ri r· . , 
I,..., 'J on.cticed in 
·' 
" ~· 
:i. • ~h, gosh, I don't ~~c~ :ha 11~~. Ya~ w~nt me to go 
:l ,'"" yo q. 
12 
;3 
\5 
\6 
l? 
\8 
20 
21 
23 
24 
15 
,'I. 
·"' "' . 
. l\. 
'.). 
Th~ A.v.'Jl.. 
th"< :.;+-,.h Stat9 l~~dlc'li. -"'cie':y and S~lt Lake Co1.::nty Medical 
(-;>S • 
o. 
,\. Society of 1~or,clc s~c~~ons, American College of C~est 
Prtysici;i.r.s, Junerlcan co.1. l~qe cf C'3..-dioloqy, Sal.t.. Lake Surgica:i. 
Societ:y, The Trudeau 2ocl..~ty. I'd ha•re to g~t t.he list to --
that's bi~lcally the L~rnr~~nt one~. 
r,. 
VERN D. WILDE 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Salt Lake Cuy, t.:iah 
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! 
5 i 
I 
:o c~rd' C' i~.r;y: l\RCHI\T,~ :JF St1 PGE?::' ar.d that I= rr.o-n. Of them. 
11 ). 
i2 1\. Yes. 
13 Q. In wha': Le:..:h"? 
14 I\. Gener'll surr1ery 'i!1d thoracic surgery. 
15 Q. And when WPr~ you so certifi~d? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
"A. !.et•!'! see. 
sur~ecy in 1957. 
Q. Wl)at hospitals h11ve ycu h'ld pL·1vil.:0Ps 
"A • A. t what pn 1.n t in 
Q. I' ,J like tc kn0w 
"A. Since com in~ t-o 
o. Well, I pr<?'l'JITle 
. ~ .. ~. 
time? 
a l.l of th!"m. 
!Jtah? 
that you had pri ,fi leg~s 
VERN I>. WILDE 
Cernfied Shorthand Rerorcer 
Salt Lake C:1ty, Utah 
at? 
while you were 
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.:::t IS I 
,,..1"1~~·s ("n~ 'ir~~ t~~at: Y'J .'re not a mem.ber. 1 j 
I 
11 r'd ii"l"~ '"l""J .:.ook ':heqe tr.l--.c~ up. I -Joi-.· t re;, i Ly ,c..,ov specif.i.call7. 
6. c. =~~ ~ou be mo~" P~ecific '~out what loc~l hospital 
9 1 b'!.ck i 'l ~!""'" Yo r-k • 
. 0 I J. i\ny others? 
A. I'd h-!!Vf' to l'Jok ,iD co Re<?.. I was at -- in Be:rnu.~da at:. 
12 ! "°gers P.,,.,,.rt Foundatic::i., which I'm not I\ member of, about a yaar 
13 I 
I ~q0 • 
141 
T~e gr!''it ~ajori':y 0[ th~ r~·tinas are thos~ that:·~ a 
15 
I r ":J'i°:.her fr~'" ""~"': ·10•1're telii'1g me that you customarily 
16 I at':!'nd rre"'':.!.na!'I liter'\L.·l ~ll ever the country and out of t:ie 
11 
l! 
19 
20 
n 
22 
23 
15 
-:ountry? 
"\p~:-cnciml!lt:ely h("'•4 m,iir,y thoracic surgeons are there in 
the Unit~d StataA that "lre eo~rd certified at the present time? 
\. 
Q. 
"A. 
I'd 9.'iY. 
I don't have th'it axl\ct figure. 
Do yo•1 rave "'n <>?timate? 
Scme'-•he."e be':ween a thousand And fifteen hundred 
0~i~h ournal is th~ ~n~ that t~e Board certified 
VERN D. WILDE 
Cemfied Shorthand Reporter 
Salt Lah City, Ucah 
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; i ;'"1l'"(iL\'V-l!\.~r1J.i. 11r ~uronr_-.,. 
I'd have to re'Tiew thctt 
~. Ir. Texa<i ai: t.he ,..,,.a.ct I!'lst1~·1t~, Texas Heart Instituta --
Q. 
11 :... }:'.'.\, no. th~t·~ '..;-,Houston. 
12 In Californi~ at the ~niversity of Californi~ and I 
13 belie·:p ever in Oakland ~': one time. I don't remam.oer th.a~ 
14 hc.spit~l n"lme. In Ne,., York at the Roosevelt Hospital and once 
15 
up at +:hf! N<>w York Hosplt'll and .:it the Mo,.mt Sinai. 
16 
C. i" 0 11, while you wert:> obsf>r•·ing these varic•.;s cparatior,s 
17 
'J5in-;r the b;ri:ass machi.:le ln these o:'1':'r are-'!3 i"l T.;.xas, California 
18 
>nd N~"" Y')rk, di.d you h".ive ccc'laicn to compare tl-\.e quality of 
19 
the "urqery which w~~ i:~rformed at tncse institutions ...,ith the 
!O Cf~'llit:y which was perfcrmed at H.e l''Jly Cros!! Hospital involving 
!l the f.. same type o. surg~r;:7 
22 
.II.. Ye~. 
l3 
VERN D. WILDE 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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i ! ~L thA3P other in~ti~~~lcn9 ~c ~r~,i~ a6dit~ona: 
2lw1ic-h ·;-:,."; ,3;:iply 'l'.~ P::..·: :::re:="" 'io<1p\'.~l? 
i j 
I 
C't cours~. 
~r.formar..ion 
" .. r_·c •:ntil l 17 2 'nd Y"~ bAen P'"rforminq cardiovascular 
9; !'.:.ira"'!"Y :,sinq 1:.he byr5sc; ma!";hlne on a regular basis? I . 
~0 I A. 
;1 C. C'\;:> you giv~ :ne sc-m!!.' kir:d of brAakdown !.n general tsrms 
12 .,~ i::0 '\i:;;::;r:'.)xi!Tll\t~ly l':o"' "'"ny i:·ro-:-e'.'lures you were performing in 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
~he Y'"""r .:. '.' 71 "'hi ch iT: ·rel ·cr<>d the byp.urs machine? 
A. ~"·Ht year? 
,?.._. r =0·1ldn't gtv~ ycu that figure. 
1\. I de;.· t: ':hi"llt I c0u.i..d do th.1t without looking it up, 
o. lvm1ld the m1mt'~r <'.lf procE>dure<! wnich you performed in 
l 1il ir"r0l ·1ing the bypai::s machine be more than ten? 
~. a~. certainly. 
O. Wc11ld it be mo..-p tnan 40? 
Q. ;..ro•1ld it be mnr~ tha"'I a hundred.? 
'~)"' ' • -r +- • rfr I •· would te to that fiaure b~t I 
VERN D. WILDE 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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